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Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the
Cohen 's Handbook Cutting-Room Floor

JOHN P. LAVELLE*

I. INTRODUCTION

The most dramatic development in the field of Indian law during the
years between publication of the 19821 and 20052 editions of Cohen's
Handbook of Federal Indian Law has been the Supreme Court's reliance
on a judicially devised theory for denying the inherent sovereign governing
authority of Indian nations in cases where Congress has not acted to divest
tribes of this authority. The executive committee of the board of authors
and editors for the 2005 revision of Cohen's Handbook3 recognized the
importance of discussing this recent line of cases in-depth and entrusted me
with the task of preparing the draft. As a result of final editing decisions
. Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. Member of the executive
committee of the board of authors and editors of the 2005 edition of Cohen's Handbook of Federal
Indian Law.
In the course of preparing drafts of this discussion of the Supreme Court's "implicit divestiture"
line of cases, I received many helpful comments from my fellow members of the executive committee
flor the 2005 edition of Cohen ' Handbook, and I sincerely thank them all: Professor Robert T.
Anderson, University of Washington School of Law; Professor Bethany R. Berger, Wayne State
University Law School; Professor Carole E. Goldberg, UCLA School of Law; Dean Nell Jessup
Newton, University of Connecticut School of Law; Professor Judith V. Royster, University of Tulsa
College of Law; Professor Joseph William Singer, Harvard Law School; and Professor Rennard
Strickland, University of Oregon School of Law.
As fellow members of a special subgroup of the executive committee assigned to address
sovereignty issues for the 2005 Handbook, Professors Anderson and Goldberg in particular provided
numerous specific editorial suggestions that became integral to the analysis presented in this discussion.
I am also grateful for comments and suggestions I received on portions of preliminary drafts of this
discussion from Professor Richard B. Collins and Dean David H. Getches of the University of
Colorado School of Law, both of whom made major contributions to the production of the revised
Handbook as members of the treatise's board of authors and editors.
Finally, I would like to thank Philip S. (Sam) Deloria, director of the American Indian Law
Center, Inc., for his steadfast support, encouragement, and advice with respect to my participation in
the Handbook revision project.
'FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed.).
2 COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005 ed.)
[hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
3 See supra note *.
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necessary for confining the Cohen treatise to a single volume,4 however,
the 2005 Handbook offers only an abbreviated discussion of this so-called
"implicit divestiture' line of cases.6 In this Article, I present the fuller
analytic treatment of that line of cases, as originally prepared for the 2005
Handbook and approved by the executive committee.
II. ADVENT AND MEANING OF IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE THEORY
In the modem era, Congress and the Executive Branch have reaffirmed
the core principle of federal Indian law, that apart from alienating tribal
land and treating with foreign nations, Indian tribes retain their original
inherent sovereign authority over all persons, property, and events within
Indian country unless Congress clearly and unambiguously acts to limit the
exercise of that power.8 Despite this strong trend of federal support for
tribal governments, the Supreme Court has departed from this policy in a
series of cases imposing additional limitations on tribal authority by means
of a judicially crafted theory which the Court has labeled the "implicit
divestiture of [tribal] sovereignty." 9 Deployed initially to deny tribes
jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country, 0 the
Court also has used an implicit divestiture approach in prohibiting tribes
from exercising various types of civil legislative and adjudicative
jurisdiction."
The term "implicit divestiture" has been used by commentators as a
convenient label for generally identifying all the cases that appear to reflect
application of judicially created limitations on the inherent sovereign
powers of Indian tribes, 12 and the term is used in this general sense in this
discussion and the 2005 edition of Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian
4 See Foreword to COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at xii-xv (describing editing process for
2005 edition of COHEN'S HANDBOOK).

5 See discussion infra Part II and accompanying notes.

See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.02[3].
7 For those parts of this discussion that appear in the 2005 edition of COHEN'S HANDBOOK,

6

permission to reprint has been granted by the American Indian Law Center, Inc., which owns the
copyright.
8 Cf United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202, 204-05 (2004) (quoting Government-toGovernment Relations With Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22951 (Apr. 29,
1994)) ("Congressional policy ... now seeks greater tribal autonomy within the framework of a
'government-to-government relationship' with federal agencies."). For a discussion of current
congressional policies supporting Indian self-determination and tribal self-governance, see COHEN'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 1.07.
9 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
1oSee discussion infra Part III and accompanying notes.
" See discussion infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
12E.g., N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of

Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 353 (1994); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for
Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers,

109 YALE L.J. I (1999); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to
Implement its Imperfect Notion ofFederalism in Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267 (2000).
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Law as well. 13 Opinions of the Supreme Court and individual Justices have
conveyed conflicting views, however, about the nature of the jurisdictional
theory the term purportedly signifies. In UnitedStates v. Wheeler the
Court in dicta adverted to its prior decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, which found tribal power to prosecute non-Indians lacking
because of a perceived incompatibility between the exercise of that power
and "the overriding sovereignty of the United States,"' 4 as typifying the
implicit divestiture approach.' 5 The Court added that "[t]he areas in which
such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are
those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of
the tribe,"'16 a description that seems factually accurate in light of both
Oliphantand Johnson v. M'Intosh, the precedent characterized in Oliphant
as having determined "that the Indian tribes' 'power to dispose of the soil
at their own will, to whomever they pleased' was inherently lost to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States."' 1 Wheeler's dictum referring
to tribal authority over nonmembers thus appears merely to describe facts
common to the two decisions that the Court in Oliphant portrayed as
because of a conflict
having found certain tribal powers implicitly divested
8
with the United States's overriding sovereignty.'
This reading of Wheeler was subsequently confirmed in Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, where the Court
held that the respondent tribes retained their inherent sovereign authority to
tax sales of cigarettes to nonmembers at Indian-owned retail outlets within
reservation boundaries. 19 Distinguishing Oliphant and citing the Wheeler
dicta, the Court wrote:
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the
tribes' dependent status. This Court has found such a
divestiture in cases where the exercise of tribal sovereignty
would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the
13See, e.g., COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.03 (discussing congressional authorization of
tribal powers).
14Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978); see discussion infra Part III.A
and accompanying notes.
15See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
16id

7Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209 (quoting Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823));
cf.Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831) (dictum) (opining that "any attempt
[by foreign nations] to acquire [Indian tribes'] lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would
be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility"), quoted in Oliphant,
435 U.S. at 209, andcitedin Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
8 References in Oliphant and Wheeler to Justice Johnson's separate opinion in the early case of
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810) (opinion of Johnson, J.), cited in Wheeler, 435 U.S.
at 326, and discussed in Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209, raise special problems. See infra notes 37-44 and
accompanying text.
'9Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-54

(1980).
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National Government .... [W]e can see no overriding
federal interest that would necessarily be frustrated by tribal
taxation. 20
Colville thus reinforces the view that the implicit divestiture theory, as
discussed in Wheeler and applied in Oliphant, concerns perceived conflicts
with overriding national sovereignty interests rather than nonmembers'
claims of immunity from tribal law on the basis of "tribes' dependent
status."
Ambiguity about the meaning of "the implicit divestiture of
' 1 reappeared in Montana
sovereignty ' ,,2
v. United States, however. 222
Holding that the Crow Tribe lacked inherent sovereign authority to regulate
nonmember hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee lands within the Crow
Reservation, the Montana Court emphasized Wheeler's language referring
' 23
to "'the relations between an Indian tribe andnonmembers of the tribe,'
but omitted Wheeler's recitation of the specific cases involving such
relations in which the Court went on to intimate a lack of tribal authority
because of judicially perceived conflicts with overriding national
sovereignty interests.24 This omission contributed to the Montana Court's
apparently distorted view of "the principles of inherent [tribal]
sovereignty" profiled in Wheeler,25 precipitating a debate among the
26
Justices about the meaning of implicit divestiture theory generally.
20Id.at 153-54 (citations omitted).
21 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
22450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981); see also discussion infra Part IV.A.1. and accompanying notes.
23Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326) (emphasis added by the Montana
Court).
24 See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326 (citing, inter alia, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191 (1978); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831) (dictum); Johnson v.
M'ntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823)).
25Montana,450 U.S. at 563.
26 Compare, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 378-79 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring)
(observing that the Montana Court "repeatedly pressed the member-nonmember distinction" and
opining that this distinction "seems clearly to indicate, without restriction to the criminal law, that the
inherent authority of the tribes has been preserved over [tribal members] but not [nonmembers]"), Duro
v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 686-87 (1990) (intimating that in distinguishing between tribal members and
nonmembers for purposes of determining tribal governance the Montana Court "relied upon the view of
tribal sovereignty set forth in Oliphant"), Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 426-27 (1989) (opinion of White, J.) (citations omitted) (opining that the
Montana Court reconciled Colville with Montana's presumptive denial of tribal authority over
nonmembers by "citing Colville as an example of the sort of 'consensual relationship' that might even
support tribal authority over nonmembers on fee lands" and that Wheeler "made clear ...that
regulation of 'the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe' is necessarily
inconsistent with a tribe's dependent status, and therefore tribal sovereignty over such matters of
'external relations' is divested"), City of Poison v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 459 U.S.
977, 979-80 (1982) (order denying cert.) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (suggesting that
"the more recently expressed doctrines reaffirmed in Montana" should guide resolution of the
"conflicting indications [of the scope of tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers] from our
decisions in Montana v. United States, Oliphantv. Suquamish, and UnitedStates v. Wheeler, on the one
hand, and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation on the other hand"), and
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Although the debate continues, the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in
United States v. Lara, in which the Court validated Congress's repudiation
of a prior decision denying tribes' inherent sovereign power to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, 27 appears to support the
position that the theory signifies loss of tribal authority based on particular,
judicially perceived conflicts with the United States's overriding
sovereignty.28
III. LIMITATIONS ON TRIBES' POWERS OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

A. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court held that
"Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish nonIndians., 29 The case involved habeas corpus challenges to the Suquamish
Tribe's inherent sovereign authority to prosecute two non-Indian
defendants for misdemeanor crimes stemming from the defendants'
allegedly dangerous and reckless conduct on the Port Madison
Reservation. In positing the existence of a historical assumption, shared
by all three branches of the federal government, that Indian tribes lack
authority to try and to punish non-Indians, the Court relied on selected
treaty language, opinions of attorneys general issued in 1834 and 1855,
defeated congressional bills and accompanying legislative reports, dictum
from an 1878 opinion by a district court judge, and a withdrawn 1970
opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior. 3 The Court
made clear, however, that this historical assumption alone would be
insufficient to compel the conclusion that tribes lack inherent criminal
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 171-72 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that
the Montana Court "indicated that the principle underlying Oliphant" was "that tribes possess limited
power over nonmembers"), with Duro, 495 U.S. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reasoning that under
applicable precedent tribes' criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is not automatically
foreclosed because "[a] tribe is implicitly divested of powers to have external relations" only when
those powers "are necessarily inconsistent with the overriding interest of the greater sovereign"),
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 451-53, 452 n.3 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (relying on Wheeler and Colville for
the proposition that "tribal sovereignty is not implicitly divested except in those limited circumstances
principally involving external powers of sovereignty where the exercise of tribal authority is
necessarily inconsistent with the tribes' dependent status" and asserting that "Wheeler simply stands for
the uncontroversial proposition that those specific aspects of inherent sovereignty that necessarily have
been divested ... involve tribal relations with non-Indians"), and South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S.
679, 699 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 153) ("This Court has found
implicit divestiture of inherent sovereignty necessary only 'where the exercise of tribal sovereignty
would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government .... '").
27 541 U.S. 193, 197-98 (2004) (acknowledging statutory displacement ofDuro v. Reina).
28
See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.03.
29 435 U.S. 191,212 (1978).
30

Id. at 194.

"' See id. at 197-205.
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jurisdiction over non-Indians.32 Rather, the Court invoked this assumption
to support its own dispositive view
that tribes' exercise of such authority is
33
"
status.
their
with
"'inconsistent
Oliphant portrays its independent finding of a limitation on the
inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes as consistent with the Court's historic
role in Indian affairs.3 The decision has been consistently perceived by
commentators, however, as improperly licensing the judiciary to limit
tribal authority in a manner incompatible with foundational principles of
Indian law as well as contemporary congressional policy supporting tribal
sovereignty and self-determination. 3 5 Identifying some of the problems
inhering in the Court's reasoning and decision in Oliphant is particularly
important in view of the growing number of subsequent Indian law cases
that have extended the rationale for Oliphant 6 and the incompatibility of
this line of cases with prior Indian law doctrine.
The Oliphant Court presented its theory of "inherent limitations on tribal
37
powers" stemming from the tribes' "incorporation into the United States
as consonant with the early cases of Johnson v. M'Intosh38 and Fletcher v.
Peck. 39
Those cases, however, do not support the methodology or
conclusion reached in Oliphant. In M'Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall, writing
32 See id. at 206 (declaring "the commonly shared presumption of Congress, the Executive
Branch, and lower federal courts that tribal courts do not have the power to try non-Indians" as "not
conclusive on the issue before us"); cf id. at 208 ("By themselves, these treaty provisions [with the
Washington tribes] would probably not be sufficient to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians if
the Tribe otherwise retained such jurisdiction."). In United States v. Lara, the Supreme Court
characterized Oliphant instead as a decision resting primarily on treaties and federal legislation. Lara,
541 U.S. at 205; see also Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 853-54 (1985)
("[Oliphant's] holding ... concluded that federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on the federal
courts to try non-Indians for offenses committed in Indian Country had implicitly pre-empted tribal
jurisdiction.").
33 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir.
1976)
(decision
34 below)) (emphasis added by the Supreme Court).
See id.at 209-11.
35See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant
v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 616 (1979); Duthu,
supra note 12, at 366-67, 375-76, 381; Frickey, supra note 12, at 35-38; Robert Laurence, Martinez,
Oliphant and FederalCourt Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 411, 419-21 (1988); John P. LaVelle, Petitioner's Brief-Reargument of Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69, 71, 89 (2003); Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v.
Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 399-400,
411, 440-41 (1993); Catherine Baker Stetson, Decriminalizing Tribal Codes: A Response to Oliphant,
9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51, 56, 59-60 (1981). But see Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the
JurisdictionofIndian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479, 528-29 (1979) (supporting Oliphant's outcome
as applied to non-Indians settling on reservation lands pursuant to federal policy).
36 E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358, 364 (2001); Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
445, 453, 459 (1997); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 682, 685 (1990) (overturned by congressional statute);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1981); see also discussion infra Parts III.B.-IV. and
accompanying notes.
3 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209.
" 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
'9 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); see Oliphant,435 U.S. at 209.
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for the Court, found that "discovery" by the European nations did not
extinguish the Natives' sovereignty but did necessarily diminish it to the
extent of denying tribes "their power to dispose of the soil at their own will,
As the Oliphant Court noted, this
to whomsoever they pleased. ''4
conclusion reflected a concern that such alienation would jeopardize the
fledgling nation's territorial security by exposing lands within the boundaries
of the United States to potential acquisition by foreign nations.4 1 Oliphant
goes on, however, to suggest that the Marshall Court's recognition of
limitations on inherent tribal authority was not confined to matters involving
tribal assertions of external powers that endangered the United States's
territorial security, but included matters of internal tribal governmental
authority relating to non-Indians.42 However, to support this proposition, the
Oliphant Court extracted language from dissenting commentary in Fletcher
v. Peck,43 language that appears, moreover, to posit restrictions on state,
rather than tribal, authority in Indian country. 44 This reliance on ambiguous,
dissenting commentary in Fletcher weakens Oliphant's suggestion that a
denial of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians conforms to
foundational principles of Indian law.
Indeed, Oliphant's "incorporation" theory is contradicted by the text
and reasoning of the Marshall cases. Thus, in Johnson v. M'Intosh, the
Court explained that while "[m]ost usually" colonized peoples "are
incorporated with the victorious nation," this process by which "the
conquered" are "united by force to strangers" was "incapable of
application" to "the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country. ' 4 Similarly,
"

4 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574.
41See Oliphant,435 U.S. at 209.
42 See id. at

209-10.

43 Oliphant describes Justice Johnson's opinion in Fletcher as a "concurrence," see Oliphant,

435 U.S. at 209; see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978), but Johnson himself
conceded that his view was a dissenting position relative to that of the Marshall Court majority in the
case, see Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 143, 145-46 (opinion of Johnson, J.) (dissenting from the Court's
conclusion that Indian title is not "absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state."). For a
discussion of Fletcher,see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 15.04[2], at 971-72.
" Read in context, Justice Johnson's opinion appears to invoke "the right of governing every
person within [the Indians'] limits except themselves," Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 147 (opinion of Johnson,
J.), quoted in Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209, to argue that states' proprietary interest in Indian lands is
diminished in a manner analogous to states' limited governing authority in Indian country. See
Lavelle, supra note 35, at 83-85. If the statement is read to address tribal powers, however, it fails
nonetheless as legal authority since Justice Johnson's restrictive view of tribal sovereignty, as
subsequently articulated in his concurring opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,
21, 25, 27-28 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring), was rejected by a majority of Justices in Cherokee
Nation, see id. at 16 (Marshall, C.J.) ("So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character
of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing
its own affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been completely
successful.") and, later, in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832) ("We have
applied [the words 'treaty' and 'nation'] to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the
earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.").
41 M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 589-91; see Milner S. Ball, John Marshall and Indian Nations in the
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in Worcester v. Georgiathe Court repeatedly affirmed that the mere advent
of relations between Indian tribes and the United States government did not
thereby imlicitly effect any diminishment of the tribes' original national
character. The Marshall Court in Worcester clarified, moreover, that the
"discovery" principle of Johnson v. M'Intosh must be understood as
restricting the rights of colonizing powers vis-i-vis one another, as well as
the rights of non-Indians who purported to purchase lands from the Indians,
rather than limiting the inherent sovereign authority of the Indian tribes
themselves.4 7
A further problem with Oliphant's view of inherent limitations on
tribal powers is its lack of grounding in positive law. Unlike the Oliphant
Court, the Marshall Court in Johnson v. M'Intosh took care to justify its
finding of a limit on tribal sovereignty on the basis of inferences drawn
from multiple sources of positive law affecting relations between tribes and
the United States and, earlier, between tribes and Great Britain, including
royal charters, treaties, and acts of colonial assemblies. 48 For the Marshall
Beginning and Now, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1183, 1188-89 (2000); LaVelle, supra note 35, at 81-82.
46 See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. at 555-57 (noting that all congressional statutes regulating trade
and intercourse with Indians "treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to
afford that protection which treaties stipulate," and that those enactments "manifestly consider the
several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which
their authority is exclusive"; also, describing the Cherokee Nation's relationship with the newly
established United States government as "that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one
more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects
to the laws of a master"); cf Duthu, supra note 12, at 371 (observing that "Marshall in no place
indicates that [M'Intosh's] limitation on tribal power stemmed from qualities or characteristics inherent
to tribes").
47 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543-44. The Court wrote:
This ["discovery"] principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because it was the
interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation making the discovery, as its
inevitable consequence, the sole right of acquiring the soil and of making
settlements on it. It was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of
competition among those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the
previous rights of those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by
discovery among the European discoverers; but could not affect the rights of those
already in possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a
discovery made before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right to purchase,
but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.
Id. at 544; see also LaVelle, supra note 35, at 81-82 (discussing Worcester's clarification of the
"discovery" principle); Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court's "Whack-A-Mole" Game Theory in
Federal Indian Law, a Theory that Has No Place in the Realm ofEnvironmental Law, 7 GREAT PLAINS
NAT. RESOURCES J. 90, 116 (2002) (same).
49 See, e.g., M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 580 (discussing royal charters granting land title in the British
colonies that conveyed proprietary interest inconsistent with unrestricted tribal power to alienate
property); id. at 583-84 (summarizing a 1763 treaty in which Great Britain ceded lands to France and
finding that it implied a preclusion of tribal power to reconvey portion of the ceded lands to Great
Britain); id. at 604 (analyzing acts of American colonial assemblies prohibiting land purchases from the
Indians and finding that they evince a national policy of non-alienability of Indian lands). The
observation that Johnson v. M'Intosh is rooted in sources of positive law rather than judicially made
common law is consonant with M'Intosh's invocation of the doctrine of "discovery" for justifying the
Court's conclusion, a doctrine devised within the civil law legal tradition of continental Europe that
rejected as anathema the notion of a lawmaking role for the judiciary. See generally JOHN HENRY
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Court, alienation of tribal property without Congress's consent conflicted
with these expressions of the political branches. 49 By contrast, the
Oliphant Court did not identify any .provisions of positive law clearly
inconsistent with the exercise of tribal power.5
The weakness of its reliance on foundational principles and positive
law suggests that Oliphant'sdenial of inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians is primarily a projection of the Court's own policy views
concerning the proper scope of tribal governmental authority within the
demographically diverse settings of contemporary Indian country.5 ' Thus,
the Court reasoned that preventing tribes from prosecuting and punishing
non-Indians accused of committing crimes in Indian country is proper in
light of the federal government's "great solicitude that its citizens be
protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on their
personal liberty. 5 2 Judicial initiative in creating policy-driven limitations
on inherent tribal powers is in tension, however, with the federal courts'
traditional deference to Congress with respect to policymaking in Indian
affairs.5 3 The Supreme Court's traditional self-restraint with respect to
limitations on tribal authority hag considerable normative appeal in view of
the history of the forcible subjection of tribes to the political authority of
the United States. Certain core principles of federal Indian law emerged in
order to minimize the injustice attending this process of political subjection
without tribal or individual Indian consent. These principles include
maximizing judicial protection of tribes' property and preexisting
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed. 1985).
49See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 588 (reasoning that the existence of Congress's positive lawmaking

power "must negative the existence of any right which may conflict with, and control it"); cf Wall v.
Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 51-52 (1845) (upholding tribal law of divorce and noting that the United States
can change tribal laws "only by positive enactments").
50 Oliphant has been criticized for relying on suspect sources of law, quasi-law, and non-law in
declaring a historical assumption that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. See, e.g.,
Maxfield, supranote 35.
5'See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.I (1978) (noting diverse
population and land-ownership patterns within the Port Madison Reservation). But see Barsh &
Henderson, supra note 35, at 633 n.127 (noting that "[m]ost Indian tribal members have their homes on
reservations at least 20 times the size of Port Madison, and where non-Indians represent a minority of
the resident population").
52 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. Oliphant'sposition that this "great solicitude" dates to the time of
"the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of Rights," id, and therefore presumably
informs an original understanding that Indian tribes lack the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, is undermined by the fact that federal law did not prohibit state deprivations of
liberty until 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution made certain
provisions of the Bill of Rights enforceable against the states. See David H. Getches, Conquering the
CulturalFrontier: The New Subjectivism ofthe Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573,
1596 n. 97 (1996); Maxfield, supra note 35, at 400.
53See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 2.01[l; cf United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200
(2004) ("[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian
tribes, powers that we have consistently described as 'plenary and exclusive."').
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sovereignty, 54 implementing special canons of construction favoring tribal
sovereignty and Indian rights when construing federal statutes and treaties
affecting Indians, 55 and affirming the constitutional vesting in Congress of
the sole power to create limitations on tribal authority. Judicial curtailment
in Oliphant and its progeny departs from these traditional
of tribal powers
56
principles.
B. Duro v. Reina
In 1990 the Supreme Court extended Oliphant, holding in Duro v.
Reina that an Indian tribe likewise lacks inherent sovereign power to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, i.e., Indians who
are not members of the particular tribe asserting such authority.5 7 But
instead of invoking Oliphant's rationale proscribing tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians because of a perceived conflict with "the
overriding sovereignty of the United States," 58 the Duro Court relied on
dictum in United States v. Wheeler positing that "[t]he areas in which...
implicit divestiture of [tribal] sovereignty has been held to have occurred
are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers
of the tribe.",59 Adverting to "the analytic framework" of Oliphant and
Wheeler, the Court treated tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians within reservation boundaries as "a manifestation of external
relations between the Tribe and outsiders" and hence not "a part of the
tribe's internal self-governance., 60 According to the Duro Court, criminal
authority over nonmember Indians is "inconsistent with the Tribe's
delegation from
dependent status" and thus capable of existing only "by
61
Constitution.",
the
of
constraints
the
to
subject
Congress,
Duro thus purported to curtail tribal sovereignty by depicting tribal
governing authority over conduct occurring within reservation boundaries
as a manifestation of "external" sovereignty, a characterization alien to the
54 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 5.04[4] (discussing the federal government's trust
responsibility to Indians).
55 See id.
§ 2.02 (discussing Indian law canons of construction).
56 See generally Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on
Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003).
57 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
The Court thus concluded that the Salt River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Tribe did not possess inherent authority to prosecute a member of a different
tribe for allegedly firing a weapon on the Salt River Reservation in the course of shooting and killing a
at 679-81, 685.
14-year-old boy. See id.
8 Oliphant v. Suquarnish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
59 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978), quoted in Duro, 495 U.S. at 686. For
further discussion of Wheeler, see supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text; COHEN's HANDBOOK,
supra note 2, § 4.401 [I][a], at 209, § 9.05.
60Duro, 495 U.S. at 684, 686.
61Id. at 686. But see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980) ("Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent
status."); supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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63
foundational cases in Indian law 62 and not even found in Oliphant itself.
Furthermore, the historical record of positive law enactments provided
even less support for this characterization of jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians as "external" than for the result in Oliphant.64 Given these
weaknesses in the Duro Court's reasoning, the decision is better explained
as stemming from the Court's own normative concerns: "We hesitate to
adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out [a] group of
citizens, nonmember
Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not
65
include them.,
66
Very shortly after it was decided, Duro was repudiated by Congress.
The Supreme Court has since upheld Congress's reinstatement of inherent
tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.67 Nonetheless, Duro
has continued to influence the outcome of Supreme Court cases declaring
limitations
on the exercise of tribes' inherent civil authority in Indian
68

country.
62 Prior to Oliphant, the Supreme Court's Indian law cases consistently adhered to a territorial
conception of "internal" and "external" sovereignty for demarcating the extent and limits of federally
cognizable tribal powers. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (asserting
that Indian tribes retain their original sovereignty "as distinct, independent, political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial,
with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse
with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region
claimed"); Johnson v. M'ntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823) (explaining the denial of tribal
power to alienate tribal lands by observing, inter alia, that "[tihe magnificent purchase of Louisiana,
was the purchase from France of a country almost entirely occupied by numerous tribes of Indians" and
that "[y]et, any attempt of others to intrude into that country, would be considered as an aggression
which would justify war"); cf Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831) (Marshall,
C.J.) (denying Indian tribes the status of "foreign state[s]" because, inter alia, "any attempt [by foreign
nations] to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be considered by all
as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility").
63 Oliphantposits instead that limitations on tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians exist in
addition to "limitations on the tribes' power to ... exercise external political sovereignty." Oliphant,
435 U.S. at 209.
64 The Duro Court acknowledged that "[t]he historical record in this case is somewhat less
illuminating than in Oliphant .... " Duro, 495 U.S. at 688; cf id. at 703-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[A]pplying [Oliphant's] reasoning, the opposite result obtains with respect to tribal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians.... [E]nactments reflect the congressional presumption that tribes had power over
all disputes between Indians regardless of tribal membership ... . Since the scheme created by
Congress did not differentiate between member and nonmember Indians, it is logical to conclude that
Congress did not assume that the power retained by tribes was limited to member Indians.").
65 Id. at 693. For a critique of this normative position, see Singer, supra note 56, at 665--68.
6625 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000); see generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.03.
67 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
68 See discussion infra Part IV. In Lara, the Court noted that its decisions in both Duro and
Oliphant "reflect[ed] the Court's view of the tribes' retained sovereign status as of the time the Court
made them," Lara, 541 U.S. at 205, without the benefit of Congress's subsequently articulated view of
a broader scope of inherent tribal authority in the statute overturning Duro. The Court did not elaborate
whether Congress's valid displacement of the Court's restrictive view of inherent tribal authority in
Duro, Oliphant,and UnitedStates v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), necessitated reconsideration of the
Court's extension of that restrictive view in cases involving the scope of tribes' civil jurisdiction in
Indian country. For further discussion of this question, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.03.
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IV. LIMITATIONS ON TRIBES' POWERS OF CIVIL JURISDICTION

A. Civil LegislativeJurisdiction
1. Montana v. United States
The Supreme Court first applied an implicit divestiture approach 69 to
limit an Indian tribes' inherent civil authority in the 1981 case of Montana
v. United States.7 ° Montana concerned the authority of the Crow Tribe to
regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the Tribe on non-Indianowned fee lands within the boundaries of the Crow Reservation. 71 The
Court first decided that the State of Montana owned the bed of the Big
Horn River where it crossed the reservation and that in view of the passage
of allotment legislation the Tribe lacked treaty-based or statutory rights to
regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian-owned
reservation fee lands.72 The Court then addressed the Tribe's inherent
sovereign authority to exercise regulatory jurisdiction on non-Indian fee
lands within reservation boundaries.73 Adverting to "the principles of
inherent [tribal] sovereignty" announced in United States v. Wheeler and
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court asserted that "exercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or
to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation. 74
The Court concluded that regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers
on non-Indian fee lands within reservation boundaries bore "no clear
relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations" and hence was
not part of the Crow Tribe's inherent sovereign authority.75
The Montana Court did not provide a clear rationale for its apparent
denial of the Crow Tribe's inherent sovereign authority to regulate hunting
and fishing by nonmember Indians (as distinguished from non-Indians) on
non-Indian fee lands. Neither Oliphant nor Wheeler, upon which the
Montana Court relied, presented a question concerning the assertion of
inherent tribal authority over nonmember Indians, nor did either case
69

See discussion supra Part II.

70450 U.S. 544 (1981).
71

Id.at 547.

72

See id.at 556-57; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 15.05[3][b] (discussing

ownership of lands underlying navigable waterways in Indian country).
73See Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-67.
74Id. at 563-65 (discussing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), and Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). Like the Court in Oliphant, the Montana Court also
relied erroneously on Justice Johnson's dissenting remarks in Fletcher v. Peck, which the Court
mislabeled a "concurrence." Id. at 565 (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147 (1810)
(opinion of Johnson, J.)); see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
75Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65.
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produce a holding concerning tribes' civil jurisdiction.7 6 Before Montana,
the only Supreme Court case holding that jurisdiction on Indian
reservations may vary according to the member/nonmember status of those
putatively subject to governmental regulation drew that distinction with
respect to state rather than tribal jurisdiction. 7 The rationale offered for
applying that distinction to state taxing authority was that allowing the
state to tax individuals who are not "constituents of the governing Tribe"
could not infringe on tribal self-government.78 Since Montana, the Court
has replicated that justification for using the member/nonmember
distinction in a case involving tribal criminal jurisdiction 79 and has invoked
the distinction as dicta in cases involving tribal civil jurisdiction as well. °
In 1991, however, Congress repudiated the Supreme Court's decision in
Duro v. Reina,8 1 which used the member/nonmember distinction for tribal
criminal jurisdiction.82 This enactment places in doubt all subsequent
judicial reliance on the distinction for determining the scope of tribal civil
authority in Indian country.
The Montana Court conceded that "Oliphant only determined inherent
tribal authority in criminal matters" but asserted that "the principles on
which it relied support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of
the tribe., 8 3 The Court then announced two exceptions to this "general
proposition":
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also
retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
76 See,

e.g., id.at 565 (noting that "Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal

matters").
77 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
160-61 (1980) (state taxing authority); see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 700-01 n.1 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
718Colville, 447 U.S. at 161.
7
9Duro, 495 U.S. at 687.
80 E.g., Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (adverting to member/nonmember
distinction in limiting tribes' inherent authority to exercise on-reservation adjudicative jurisdiction);
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695 n.15 (1993) (invoking member/nonmember distinction in
alluding to scope of inherent tribal sovereignty).
SI 495 U.S. 676.
82 See discussion

supra Part III.B. and accompanying notes; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra

note 2, § 4.03.
83 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
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conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation
when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe. 84
Read against the backdrop of previous case law affirming tribal powers,85
these two exceptions can be reconciled with the general proposition that
tribes retain broad authority in Indian country over the conduct of Indians
and non-Indians alike, limited only in the rare instance where no significant
tribal interest is at stake with respect to the conduct of nonmembers on
reservation lands owned in fee by non-Indians.86 This contextual reading
of Montana suggests that in most cases tribes' inherent civil regulatory
authority over non-Indians and nonmember Indians in Indian country
should be cognizable under Montana's exceptions, which must be
construed broadly to comport with longstanding principles of Indian law. 7
2. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation
The Supreme Court has not circumscribed Montana in accordance with
fundamental principles of Indian law, however. Instead, the Court
repeatedly has extended Montana in declaring restrictions on tribes'
inherent powers of civil jurisdiction in a variety of additional settings, with
countervailing opinions announcing mutually incompatible rationales for
applying that decision. For example, in Brendale v. ConfederatedTribes &
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,88 the Court could not generate a
majority opinion to decide whether the Yakima Nation had inherent
jurisdiction to pass zoning laws regulating nonmembers' use of their fee
lands within a reservation. In three opinions offering conflicting rationales,
the Court held that the Yakima Nation possessed inherent zoning authority
SId. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
85See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.0l[l][a]-[2][e]; cf Brendale v. Confederated

Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 451 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)
("Our approach to inherent tribal sovereignty remained essentially constant in all critical respects in the
century and a half between John Marshall's first illumination of the subject and this Court's Montana
decision.").
86See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 ("[N]othing in this case suggests that ...non-Indian
hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe's political or economic security as to justify tribal
regulation.").
87 Montana thus may be read as a judicial construction of allotment legislation to presumptively
abrogate inherent tribal authority over non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee lands, a
presumption rebuttable by showing that survival of inherent sovereign regulatory authority is consonant
with consensual relationships or otherwise necessary to protect significant tribal interests. Cf David H.
Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuitof States' Rights, Color-BlindJustice and

Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REv. 267, 333 (2001). Under this contextual reading, Montana is
merely an anomalous departure from judicial reliance on basic Indian law canons of construction. See
COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 2.02 (discussing Indian law canons of construction).
8 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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over nonmember-owned lands located in an area of the reservation closed
to the general public and dominated by tribally owned and member-owned
parcels,89 but lacked such authority over nonmember-owned lands in an
area in which nearly half the acreage was owned in fee by nonmembers. 90
Justice White, writing for himself and three other Justices, would have
denied tribal zoning jurisdiction over all nonmember-owned fee lands,
applying Montana and finding that the two exceptions articulated in that
case were not satisfied. 91 According to Justice White, all substantial tribal
interests related to land use could be addressed in county zoning
proceedings, coupled with a right to sue county authorities in federal court
if those authorities failed to vindicate the tribe's federally protected interest
under Montana against nonmembers' "demonstrably serious" land-use
impacts that "imperil the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health and welfare of the tribe. 92
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Justice O'Connor, approved
tribal zoning authority over nonmember-owned fee lands in the "closed"93
area of the reservation but rejected it for such lands in the "open" area.
To reach this result, however, Justice Stevens relied on a theory of tribal
authority based on tribal power to exclude nonmembers from lands within
reservation boundaries, a theory that he originally had advanced in dissent
in Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe.94 Yet the majority in Merrion had
effectively rejected that theory as providing an inadequate explanation for
the full extent of inherent tribal powers within reservations. 95
Justice Blackmun wrote a third opinion in Brendale, joined by two
other Justices, concluding that the Yakima Nation retained its inherent
authority to regulate land use by members and nonmembers alike
throughout the Yakima Reservation because the exercise of this zoning
89See id. at 448 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
90See id. at 422-23 (opinion of White, J.).

91Id. at 425-27 (opinion of White, J.). Justice White added that even if a nonmember's proposed
on-reservation land use "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe" within the meaning of Montana's second exception,
Montana's statement that "[a] tribe may" retain inherent power in such circumstances reposes
discretion in the Court to deny the tribe's inherent governing authority. Id. at 428-29 (opinion of
White, J.) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566) (alteration and emphasis added by Justice White). But

see id. at 459 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) ("Read in context, I think it clear that the Court's use of the
word 'may' was not an expression of doubt about the existence of tribal sovereignty under the
enumerated circumstances, but rather, was a reflection of the obvious fact that the comment was pure
dictum.").
92 Id.

at 431 (opinion of White, J.).
93See id. at 447-48 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
94 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159-90 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Applying this theory, Justice Stevens found that the Tribe had retained most of its power to exclude
nonmembers only from the "closed" area of the reservation, and therefore retained inherent authority
over nonmember-owned fee lands solely within that area. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 441, 446-47 (opinion
of Stevens, J.).
95See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141, 144.
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authority was "central to 'the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe' within the meaning of Montana's second exception. 96 Justice
Blackmun criticized Justice White's proposed application of Montana in
the context of tribal zoning authority as "guarantee[ing] that adjoining
reservation lands would be subject to inconsistent and potentially
incompatible zoning policies" and as practically "strip[ping] tribes of the
power to protect the integrity of trust lands over which they enjoy
unquestioned and exclusive authority., 97 Justice Blackmun likewise
criticized Justice Stevens' approach for its reliance on tribal proprietary
power to exclude rather than the Court's precedents demarcating the limits
of inherent tribal sovereignty. 98 Unlike either of its rival opinions-and
unlike any subsequent treatment of the issue by the Supreme CourtJustice Blackmun's opinion in Brendale attempts to reconcile the facially
anomalous Montana decision with the Court's precedents addressing the
extent and limits of inherent tribal sovereignty. 99 According to Justice
Blackmun, Montana "reasonably may be read, and ... should be read, to
recognize that tribes may regulate the on-reservation conduct of nonIndians whenever a significant tribal interest is threatened or directly
affected." ' 00
3. South Dakota v. Bourland
Judicial discord regarding tribal civil authority over nonmembers was
compounded after Brendale when the Supreme Court decided
South Dakota v. Bourland, a case addressing the power of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians in an area
of the Tribe's reservation taken by Congress for a federal dam construction
project.10' Bourland's conclusion that the Tribe lacked such authority rests
largely on treaty and statutory construction. 0 2 Nevertheless, the Court's
relatively brief treatment of the issue of inherent tribal sovereignty further
destabilized the Court's jurisprudence regarding the scope of tribal
regulatory authority over nonmembers. In particular, the Court asserted in
a footnote that "after Montana, tribal sovereignty over nonmembers
'cannot survive without express congressional delegation' and is therefore
not inherent."' 3 This footnote seems to conflict, however, with Montana's
96Brendale, 492 U.S. at 458 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
97

1d. at 449 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
8Id.at 462 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
99Id.at 449-59 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
100Id.at 456-57 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
101
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 681-82 (1993).
102See id.at 687-94; cf id.
at 698 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court's focus on the
9

Tribe's treaty-based regulatory authority as "barely... acknowledging that the Tribe might retain such
authority as an aspect of its inherent sovereignty").
103Id. at 695 n.15 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
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observation that "Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,
even on non-Indian fee lands" when either of Montana's two exceptions is
satisfied.' °4 This tension might be explained by the Bourland Court's
declining to address whether the two Montana exceptions might justify a
finding of inherent tribal authority.' 0 5 Nonetheless, Bourland's minimal
commentary appeared to portend further deterioration0 6 of inherent tribal
powers under the Court's implicit divestiture approach.1
4.

Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley

One such additional curtailment of tribes' inherent authority to exercise
civil legislative jurisdiction on Indian reservations occurred as a result 0of7
the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley.
Atkinson addressed the inherent power of the Navajo Nation to raise
governmental revenues by levying a tax on all overnight guests of hotels
located on lands within the boundaries of the Navajo Nation
Reservation.108 The Supreme Court declared the tax inapplicable to nontribal member guests of hotels located on non-Indian fee lands within the
reservation.1 0 9 The Court reasoned that the Navajo Nation had failed to
justify its authority to impose the tax under either of Montana's exceptions,
and that the tax therefore was prohibited pursuant to "Montana's general
rule that Indian tribes lack civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian
fee land.'' °
Because the issue of tribal taxation of nonmembers on non-Indian fee
land in Atkinson resembled the issue of tribal regulation of nonmembers on
non-Indian fee land in Montana, the Atkinson Court's application of the
Montana test might have seemed predictable; and indeed the Court itself
asserted that it simply was "apply[ing] Montana straight up."' 1 ' The
112
Court's intervening decision in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,
however, strongly suggested that despite this formal resemblance, the
104Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added); see also id. at 566 (emphasis added) ("A tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."); supra text accompanying note 84.
'o' See Bourland,508 U.S. at 695-96 (remanding on the issue of tribal authority under Montana's
exceptions). On remand a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed by a 2 to 1 vote the
district court's conclusion that the tribe's regulatory jurisdiction was not justified under Montana's
exceptions. South Dakota v. Bourland, 39 F.3d 868, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1994).
106For a discussion of implicit divestiture theory, see discussion supra Part II.
107532 U.S. 645 (2001).
'0' See id. at 648.
0

' 9 See id. at 659.

hOld. at 654-59.

. Id. at 654.
455 U.S. 130 (1982).

1.2

note 2, § 8.04[2][b], at 716-17.

For further discussion of Merrion, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra
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Court would not apply Montana when a tribe subjected nonmembers
within reservation boundaries to a nondiscriminatory tax for the purpose of
raising revenues to support essential governmental programs. 1 3 In
Merrion the Court affirmed the inherent sovereign power of the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe to raise revenues by taxing economic transactions occurring
within the boundaries of the Tribe's own reservation.' 14 The Atkinson
Court acknowledged the difficulty of reconciling its application of
Montana with Merrion, observing that "[t]here are undoubtedly parts of the
Merrion opinion that suggest a broader scope for tribal taxing authority"
than that reflected in Atkinson's denial of such authority over nonmembers'
economic activities on non-Indian fee lands within reservations.1 15 The
Court thus conceded Merrion's holding that "the power to tax derives not
solely from an Indian tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal
land, but also from an Indian tribe's 'general authority,
as sovereign, to
11 6
control economic activity within its jurisdiction.'
Nonetheless, the Atkinson Court distinguished Merrion, asserting that
Merrion "was careful to note that an Indian tribe's inherent power to tax only
extended to "'transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly
113 The Court noted the Navajo Nation's apparent concession that regulatory taxes, as
distinguished from revenue-raising taxes, are subject to the Montana test. See Atkinson, 532 U.S. at
652 n.3.
114Merrion,455 U.S. at 140-41.
' Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653. Atkinson thus expressly questions Merrion'sreliance on Buster v.
Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dism'd, 203 U.S. 599 (1906), a case that confirmed the
inherent sovereign authority of the Creek Nation to levy a revenue-raising licensing tax on non-Indians
residing on non-Indian fee lands within reservation boundaries. See Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653 n.4.
Although Atkinson asserts that the Court has never endorsed Buster's application of tribal taxing power
to non-Indians engaged in activities on reservation fee land, the Court has in fact signified approval of
Buster's view that tribes' inherent sovereign authority to tax economic activity within reservation
boundaries reaches beyond conduct occurring on Indian-owned land. See, e.g., Merrion, 455 U.S. at
143-44 (quoting Buster, 135 F. at 952) (alteration and emphasis added by the Supreme Court) (quoting
Buster's conclusion "that 'In]either the United States, nor a state, nor any other sovereignty loses the
power to govern the people within its borders by the existence of towns and cities therein endowed with
the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the ownershipnor occupancy of the land within its territorial
jurisdiction by citizens orforeigners"' as confirming the Supreme Court's holding that "the Tribe's
authority to tax derives not from its power to exclude, but from its power to govern and to raise
revenues to pay for the costs of government"); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980) (citing Buster, 135 F. at 950) (relying on Buster as
support for the Supreme Court's observation that "[federal courts also have acknowledged tribal power
to tax non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic activity"); cf Colville, 447 U.S. at
152-53 (citing, inter alia, 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 214 (1900); 55 Interior Dec. 14, 46 (1934)) (relying on
Executive Branch authorities affirming the inherent sovereign power of Indian tribes to legislate with
respect to non-Indians within reservation boundaries, including via the levying of revenue-raising taxes
and regardless of land ownership, as imparting a consistent recognition by Executive Branch officials
"that Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands in which the tribes have a significant interest"). Atkinson's failure to address these
prior Supreme Court endorsements of Buster weakens Atkinson's assessment of Buster as having only
limited efficacy as authoritative precedent.
16 Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 652 (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137).
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involving a tribe or its members.""' 1 7 The Merrion Court, however, did not
intimate that tribes' inherent sovereign power to tax extended to economic
activity occurring "only" on trust lands; Merrion'sreference to "trust lands"
is simply an artifact of the Court quoting a fragment from Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, and does not8
otherwise appear in Merrion's articulations of its holding and rationale.'1
Indeed, language from Merrion that Atkinson neglects to quote strongly
suggests that a tribe's inherent taxing power is broad enough to reach activity
on all lands within the reservation, by nonmembers as well as tribal
members." 9 Atkinson's disregard of portions of Merrion's reasoning and
holding appears to derive largely from the Court's view that this disregard
was necessary to reconcile Merrion "with the Montana-Strate line of
authority, which we deem to be controlling."' 120 Limiting Merrion seems
unnecessary, however, since Montana does not appear to be inconsistent
with Merrion'sholding that Indian tribes retain "inherent power necessary to
tribal self-government and territorial management" within reservation
boundaries that is independent of, and supplemental to, any retained
authority to exclude nonmembers from tribal lands.121
17 Id.at 653 (quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137 (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 152)) (emphasis
added by the Atkinson Court). Atkinson also extracts from Merrion the statement that "a tribe has no
authority over a nonmember until the nonmember enters tribal land or conducts business with the
tribe." Merrion, 455 U.S. at 142, quoted in Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653. However, when this Merrion
fragment is restored to its original context, it becomes apparent that the Court envisioned a
nonmember's entry upon tribal land and the nonmember's participation in economic activity anywhere
within reservation boundaries as independently sufficient justifications for the tribe's assertion of that
authority. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141-42.
"' See Merrion, 455 U.S. at-137 (quoting Colville, 447 U.S. at 152), quoted in Atkinson, 532 U.S.
at 653. Colville likewise does not purport to restrict tribes' inherent taxing power over non-Indians to
activity occurring on trust lands. Indeed, Colville upholds inherent tribal taxing authority whenever
there exists "no overriding federal interest that would necessarily be frustrated by tribal taxation," and
cites approvingly several other federal court decisions affirming such authority over activities by nonIndians on non-Indian lands. Colville, 447 U.S. at 153-54 (citing Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384
(1904); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956); Buster, 135 F. 947).
119For example, without distinguishing trust from non-trust land, Merrion states that a tribe's
taxing power "derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity
within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring
contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that jurisdiction."
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137 (emphasis added). Similarly, no distinction between trust and non-trust land
appears when Merrion explains that "[t]he power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty
because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management." Id.; see also id at
141 (emphasis added) ("[W]e conclude that the Tribe's authority to tax non-Indians who conduct
business on the reservation does not simply derive from the Tribe's power to exclude such persons, but
is an inherent power necessary to tribal-self-government and territorial management."); cf Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 425 (1989) (opinion of
White, J.) (citation omitted) ("In Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, the Court held that tribes have
inherent sovereignty independent of that authority arising from their power to exclude."); id.at 454
(opinion of Blackmun, J.) (citation omitted) ("In Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, we upheld a tribe's
inherent authority to impose a severance tax on non-Indian mining on the reservation.").

"20Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653.
121Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141; see, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981)

(denying the inherent sovereign authority of the Crow Tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing
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After distinguishing Merrion, the Atkinson Court concluded that the
Navajo Nation's hotel occupancy tax as applied to nonmembers on nonIndian fee lands could not be justified under either of Montana's
exceptions. The Court dismissed the argument that the Navajo Nation had
satisfied Montana's "consensual relationships" exception by providing
numerous governmental services to the petitioner hotel and its guests,
finding "the generalized availability of tribal services patently insufficient
to sustain the Tribe's civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian fee
land."1 22 The Court reasoned that if it were to find Montana's first
exception satisfied by the provision of tribal services, "the exception would
swallow the rule," and that in any event the Court had "implicitly rejected"
23 The
a similar argument in a previous case, Strate v. A-i Contractors.1
Court further reasoned that the hotel's status as a licensed Indian trader
subject to extensive federal regulation was irrelevant to the question
whether the hotel's nonmember guests had a "consensual relationship" for
purposes of Montana's first exception, positing that the exception "requires
that the tax or regulation imposed
by the Indian tribe have a nexus to the
124
consensual relationship itself.'
The Atkinson Court also held that the Navajo Nation's hotel occupancy
tax as applied to nonmembers on non-Indian fee lands was not justified
pursuant to Montana's second exception. Acknowledging that the hotel was
located within a district of the Navajo Reservation that possessed "an
overwhelmingly Indian character,"'' 25 the Court stated that it nevertheless
"fail[ed] to see how petitioner's operation of a hotel on non-Indian fee land
'threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."' 126 The Court's application of
the second Montana exception raises more questions than it answers,
however. Notably absent is a serious analysis of whether the nonmembers'
conduct on non-Indian fee lands affected the Navajo Nation's economic
security, particularly its need for revenue to support tribal self-government.
on non-Indian fee lands within the boundaries of the Crow Reservation by asserting that such
regulatory
authority "bears no clear relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations").
122 Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 655. Presumably a tribe would have to make the provision of its services
dependent on a contract in order to satisfy the first Montana exception as so construed.
123 Id. (citing Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)).
For additional discussion of
Strate, see infra Part IV.B.2. and accompanying notes. Atkinson claims that Strate found no consensual
relationship based on nonmembers' receipt of tribal police protection while traveling on state rights-ofway within the reservation. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 655. Strate's only reference to tribal law
enforcement, however, is a statement by the Court that it did not question tribal authority to patrol all
reservation roads, including state rights-of-way. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 456 & n. 11. The Court offered
this observation not in discussing the applicability of Montana's first exception, moreover, but strictly
in the context of "align[ing]" North Dakota's on-reservation right-of-way at issue in Strate with the
non-Indian fee lands in Montana. See id.
114Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656.
.25 Id. at 657 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
126Id. (quoting Montana,450 U.S. at 566).

IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE RECONSIDERED

2006]

The Court suggested that inquiring into this tribal justification would be
improper, invoking the Court's admonition in Strate v. A-I Contractorsthat
"Montana's second exception 'can be misperceived.' 1 27 But the Strate
Court explained that to avoid such misperception, courts should focus on the
exception's "preface," that "' [a tribe's inherent power does not reach]
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations.' 1 28
Thus Strate appears to support, rather than
discourage, judicial inquiry into whether tribal taxation of nonmembers'
economic activity on non-Indian fee lands within reservation boundaries is
necessary to tribal self-government.
Another question is raised by the Court's footnote statement that "unless
the drain of the nonmember's conduct upon tribal services and resources is
so severe that it actually 'imperil[s]' the political integrity of the Indian tribe,
there can be no assertion of civil authority beyond tribal lands."' 129 This
elevated threshold for application of the second Montana exception,
implying that tribal power must be necessary to avert catastrophic
consequences, appears to stem from Atkinson's misapprehension of the use
of the term "imperil" in Montana and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.130 Although the Montana Court used
the word "imperil" in applying the second exception, it also reasoned that the
existence of state rather than tribal authority on non-Indian fee lands had had
practically no effect on tribal jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on Indian
lands, and that the tribe had "traditionally accommodated itself to" the state's
regulation of hunting and fishing on non-Indian fee lands. 3 ' Had the
Montana Court believed that absence of imperilment of the tribe's political
integrity was sufficient to defeat application of the second exception, the
Court would not have carried out this further analysis. Atkinson's intimation
that the second Montana exception can be reduced to an imperilment inquiry
thus contradicts Montana's view of the exception's broader scope.
Furthermore, in Brendale the word "imperil" appears only in the opinion of
Justice White, 132 an opinion whose rationale was expressly rejected by a
majority of the Court. 133 Thus Brendale could not have altered Montana's
second exception to coincide
with the more stringent standard advocated by
134
Justice White in Brendale.
127Id. at 657 n. 12 (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 459).
128Strate,

Court).

520 U.S. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564) (alteration added by the Strate

129Atkinson,
130

532 U.S. at 657-58 n.12 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).

492 U.S. 408 (1989).

"'iMontana, 450 U.S. at 566-67.
132Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431 (opinion of White, J.).
133 For a discussion of the divergent opinions in Brendale, see supra Part IV.A.2. and
accompanying notes.
134
See South Dakota v. Bourland, 39 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 1994) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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Because of its inconsistencies with earlier Supreme Court cases
addressing tribes' inherent sovereign authority to legislate in Indian
country, Atkinson fails to clarify this relatively new, unstable area of
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the field of Indian law. Despite these
doctrinal uncertainties, however, the line of legislative jurisdiction cases
culminating with Atkinson evinces a strong trend of judicial disapproval of
the exercise of tribal governing authority over nonmembers on non-Indian
lands within reservation boundaries. 35 The Court's recent decisions
limiting tribes' legislative jurisdiction reflect little deference to
contemporary congressional policy and entail scant reliance on Supreme
Court cases predating the series of tribal jurisdiction cases that began in
1978 with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.136 Nonetheless, the Court
has used Montana and the other legislative jurisdiction cases to limit the
civil jurisdiction of tribal courts as well. 3 7
B. Civil Adjudicative Jurisdiction
1. Antecedent Cases
In Strate v. A-i Contractors138 and Nevada v. Hicks13 9 the Supreme
Court has imposed new limitations on the power of Indian tribes to
exercise civil adjudicative authority over the conduct of nonmembers in
Indian country. As with the judicially prescribed limitations on tribes'
criminal jurisdiction and civil legislative jurisdiction, 140 these judicial
restrictions on tribes' adjudicative authority depart from longstanding
foundational principles in the field of Indian law respecting tribes' inherent
sovereign authority to resolve disputes arising within Indian country.
A useful starting point for understanding these principles is Williams v.
Lee,' 41 a case commonly regarded as the Court's first Indian law decision
of the modem era. 142 Williams v. Lee offers one of many Supreme Court
affirmations of the broad authority of tribal courts over the on-reservation
conduct of Indians and non-Indians alike, unanimously deciding that the
courts of the Navajo Nation effectively enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over
civil suits brought by non-Indians against Indian defendants for
135 Cf. Getches, supra note 87, at 273-87 (analyzing trends in the Supreme Court's Indian
law
decisions since 1969).
136435 U.S. 191 (1978); see discussion supraPart III.A.
137See discussion infra Part IV.B.

"' 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
139533 U.S. 353 (2001).
'40 For an extended discussion of the limitations on tribes' powers of criminal jurisdiction and
civil legislative jurisdiction, see supra Parts III. and IV.A.
14'
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
142

See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW: NATIVE

SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1-3 (1987).
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transactions occurring on the Navajo Reservation. 143 The Williams Court
conveyed its recognition of exclusive tribal authority over the dispute at
issue by holding that concurrent state power over the same dispute was
precluded, observing that "to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs
and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves."' 144 The Court dismissed as "immaterial" the fact that the
plaintiff seeking to have the case adjudicated in state court was a nonIndian since the non-Indian plaintiff "was on the Reservation and the
transaction with an Indian took place there."' 145 The Court emphasized its
own historic consistency in safeguarding tribes' broad adjudicative
authority on Indian reservations, concluding that 146
"[i]f this power is to be
taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it."'
The Court again stressed the importance of affirming broad tribal
adjudicative authority on Indian reservations in another unanimous decision
of the modern era, Fisher v. District Court.147 Fisher upheld the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe over an adoption proceeding 1in
48
which all parties were tribal members residing on the tribe's reservation.
As in Williams, the Court explained that its decision stemmed from the
Court's concern about the corrosive impact concurrent state-court
jurisdiction would have on the authority of tribal courts.149 Observing that
"[n]o federal statute sanctions this interference with tribal self-government,"
the Court likewise declined to authorize such interference. 50
This same high regard for the sovereign authority of tribal courts is
evident in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, where the Supreme Court
refused to construe the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) as creating an
implied federal cause of action. 15 1 The Court expressed concern that a
broad reading would amount to "a judicially sanctioned intrusion into tribal
sovereignty" at odds with the Act's manifest purpose of protecting the
authority of tribal courts. 5 2 Citing Williams, the Court wrote: "Tribal
forums are available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA .... Tribal
courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the
143Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
14 Id.; see also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987) ("If state-court jurisdiction

over Indians or activities on Indian lands would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government,
the state courts are generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law."); COHEN'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 6.01 [1], at 500, § 6.0114], at 512, § 6.03[2][a], at 525-26, § 7.03[2][a).
145Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
146id.
147 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
48
1 See id. at 383, 389.
149Id. at 388.

150Id.

"'1436 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1978) (discussing 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000)).
152Id. at 61, 63-64.
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exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important
personal and
53
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians."
In a pair of more recent cases dealing primarily with the issue of
exhaustion of tribal court remedies, 1 54 the Supreme Court provided
additional commentary supporting the jurisdiction of tribal courts. In
National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, the Court
announced a rule requiring exhaustion of tribal court remedies before a
federal court may address a federal claim challenging the tribal court's
jurisdiction. 155 The Court explained that the question of a tribal court's
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians "is not automatically foreclosed, as an
extension of Oliphant would require," and that the longstanding federal
policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination favored
the tribal court exhaustion requirement. 156 In Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.
v. LaPlante, the Court validated application of the tribal court exhaustion
rule where diversity of citizenship rather than a federal question forms the
basis of a federal court's jurisdiction.157 The Court reiterated that tribes'
civil adjudicative jurisdiction is not subject to the "substantial federal
58
limitation" applied in Oliphant to restrict tribes' criminal jurisdiction.
The Court further clarified that federal policy supporting tribal selfgovernment "operates even in areas where state control has not been
affirmatively pre-empted by federal statute," 159 thereby compelling federal
and state courts to presume the existence of tribes' inherent civil
adjudicative authority over the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians in
the absence of countermanding statutory or treaty language:
Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.
Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty
provision or federal statute. "Because the Tribe retains all
inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested
by the Federal Government, the proper inference from
silence
60
... is that the sovereign power... remains intact."'
'Id. at 65-66 (footnote and citations omitted).
'54
See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 7.04[3].
' 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985).
16Id.at 855-56 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
'"480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
5
I at 15 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191).
1d.
"9Id.at 14.
160Id. at 18 (citations omitted) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14
(1982) (alterations added by the Iowa Mutual Court)); cf Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 454-55 n.5 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (quoting Iowa
Mut., 480 U.S. at 18) (reiterating that "Iowa Mutual... stands for the proposition that civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians is a recognized part of inherent tribal sovereignty and exists 'unless affirmatively

IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE RECONSIDERED

2006]

2. Strate v. A-1 Contractors
Iowa Mutual thus was the culminating decision in an unbroken string
of modem era Supreme Court cases, beginning in 1959 with Williams v.
Lee, in which the Court consistently affirmed tribal courts' inherent
sovereign authority over the conduct of all persons, including non-Indians,
within reservation boundaries. Notwithstanding this strong case-law
backdrop supporting tribal adjudicative power, the Court in 1997 denied an
Indian tribe's inherent power to adjudicate a civil lawsuit brought by a nonIndian plaintiff against a non-Indian defendant for personal injuries arising
from an automobile accident on a state highway within the boundaries of
the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the
Court ruled that the test it devised in Montana v. United States16' for
determining whether a tribe possesses inherent sovereign power to regulate
the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian fee lands 62 applies as well to
the question of a tribe's inherent adjudicative authority over nonmembers'63
conduct on a segment of a state highway within reservation boundaries.
Applying its Montana analysis, the Court concluded that the tribal court's
jurisdiction over the disputed tort claim was not justified under either of the
two Montana exceptions and hence was prohibited by operation of
Montana's "general rule that, absent a different congressional direction,
Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on nonIndian land within a reservation."' 64
Expanding the judicially devised test for resolving the "narrow"
regulatory issue in Montana 65 into one that "broadly address[es] the
concept of 'inherent sovereignty"' required extensive discussion in
Strate.166 First, the Court distinguished National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual as cases that announced a tribal court exhaustion rule but that did
not "establish[ ] tribal-court adjudicatory authority, even over the lawsuits
involved in those cases."1 67 The Court acknowledged the statement from
Iowa Mutual that "[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless
68
affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute,"'
but observed that this statement "is preceded by three informative
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute").
161450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
162See

discussion supra Part IV.A. 1. and accompanying notes.
v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,442,453 (1997).
Id. at 446, 455-59. For a critique of other overly broad readings of Montana, see supra

163Strate
164

Part IV.A.2.-4 and accompanying notes.
165Montana, 450 U.S. at 557.
166Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 563).
67
1 1d. at 448.
168Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987), quoted in Strate, 520 U.S. at 451;
see also supra text accompanying note 160.
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citations" which the Court read as reducing the statement to "the
unremarkable proposition that, where tribes possess authority to regulate
the activities of nonmembers, '[c]ivil jurisdiction over [disputes arising out
of] such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts."",169 The Strate
Court's unconventional reading of these three citations raises serious
doubts about the way Strate handled Iowa Mutual.170 Nonetheless, after
limiting Iowa Mutual in this manner, the Court treated Montana as
establishing the applicable legal framework, proclaiming that "[a]s to
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed
nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's
7
its legislative jurisdiction."' '
The effect of the Strate Court's unconventional reading of the Iowa
Mutual statement was to transform Iowa Mutual's presumption favoring
tribal court jurisdiction over the activities of nonmembers into a presumption
against such jurisdiction, requiring tribes to justify their assertions of
adjudicative authority over nonmembers under the Court's Montana test172
Before it applied that test, however, the Court responded to the contention
that the test is limited to assertions of "tribal authority related to nonmember
Strate, 520 U.S. at 451-53 (alteration added by the Strate Court) (quoting Iowa Mut., 480 U.S.
at 18, and citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980); Fisher v. Dist. Court of the Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont.,
424 U.S. 382, 383, 389 (1976)).
170The Strate Court viewed each of these precedents as an application of the Montana framework
to an exercise of tribal authority. See id.at 452-53. As the Court noted, however, these three citations
precede, rather than follow, the Iowa Mutual statement. Id.at 452. Under conventional rules for
citations to authority in legal writing, these three citations therefore would be read as supporting the
statement they immediately follow-i.e., the proposition that "[t]ribal authority over the activities of
non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty," Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18,
rather than the statement they precede. A conventional reading of Iowa Mutual's "three informative
citations" thus would recognize them as informing the Court's understanding that Indian tribes'
inherent sovereign authority over the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians remains broad. See
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (affirming conditions under which "Indian tribes retain inherent
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,
even on non-Indian fee lands"), cited in Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18; Colville, 447 U.S. at 152-53 (noting
that federal officials "have consistently recognized that Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil
jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have a
significant interest"), cited in Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18; Fisher,424 U.S. at 387-89 (concluding that
state-court jurisdiction over on-reservation adoption proceedings in which all parties are tribal members
is precluded because such jurisdiction "plainly would interfere with the powers of [tribal] selfgovemment" and because "[n]o federal statute sanctions this interference with tribal self-government"),
cited in Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18. This more conventional reading of Iowa Mutual's "three
informative citations" as affirming, rather than denying, tribes' broad civil authority over the onreservation activities of non-Indians is further suggested by the Iowa Mutual Court's reliance on two
cases acknowledging that tribes retain all inherent sovereign powers that Congress has not expressly
precluded. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149
n.14 (1982); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)).
"7 Strate, 520 U.S. at 453.
Despite the Court's ruling, scholars continue to argue that tribal
adjudicative jurisdiction should be wider than tribal regulatory authority. See, e.g., Jamelle King, Tribal
Court General Civil JurisdictionOver Actions Between Non-Indian Plaintiffs and Defendants: Strate v.
A-1 Contractors, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV.191 (1997), Laurie Reynolds, "Jurisdiction"in FederalIndian
Law: Confusion, Contradiction,and Supreme CourtPrecedent,27 N.M. L. REv. 359 (1997).
i72 See supra text accompanying notes 73-84.
169
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activity on alienated, non-Indian reservation land" and hence does not apply
173
to nonmembers' activity on a mere right-of-way across Indian trust lands.
The Court acknowledged that "tribes retain considerable control over
nonmember conduct on tribal lands" but deemed North Dakota's federally
granted right-of-way across the Fort Berthold Reservation's trust lands
"equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non-Indian
land."'174 The Court reasoned that the right-of-way had been issued with
tribal consent as required by the relevant federal authorizing statute, that the
grant's purpose was to facilitate public access to a federal water resource
project, 175 and that the grant expressly reserved to Indian landowners only
the right to construct various crossings of the right-of-way. 176 The Court
observed that the Three Affiliated Tribes "retained no gatekeeping right"
with respect to the right-of-way and hence could not "assert a landowner's
right to occupy and exclude.' 77 Finally, in concluding that the requisite
equivalence existed between the right-of-way and land alienated to nonIndians, the Court intimated the presence of a number of discrete probative
factors, i.e., that the right-of-way was part of the state's highway system, that
it was open to the public, that traffic on the right-of-way was subject to the
state's control, that the tribes consented to the state's use of the right-of-way,
and that the tribes received payment for such use. 178 Strate's reliance on
multiple factors, including a right-of-way's purpose, has been followed by
lower federal courts when determining, for jurisdictional purposes, whether
the land on which nonmember
conduct occurs is the equivalent of land
79
alienated to non-Indians.1
After "align[ing] the right of way ... with land alienated to non173Strate, 520 U.S. at 454.

!?4Id.
17 The Court cited no authority for its account of the purpose for the right-of-way. During oral
argument, the tribal petitioners' counsel had explained that the road's purpose was to serve the tribal
community, part of which had to be relocated because of flooding caused by construction of a dam.
See Transcript of Oral Argument, Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (No. 95-1872), 1997 WL 10398 at *10-*11;
see also U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fort Berthold Agency, North Dakota,
Report of Road Replacement Program and Estimated Cost for the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation 1-2
(January 1951).
176Strate, 520 U.S. at 454-55.
177Id. at 456. Strate's suggestion that the Three Affiliated Tribes lost these rights for not having
expressly reserved them in the granting instrument, id. at 455, conflicts with the longstanding doctrinal
rule that preexisting tribal sovereignty and Indian rights are impliedly reserved unless expressly
divested by treaty or statute. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (observing
that Indian treaty provisions are "not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them--a
reservation of those not granted"); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 2.0212], at 123
(discussing reserved rights doctrine).
"8 Strate, 520 U.S. at 455-56.
179E.g., McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530, 538 (9th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing a BIA road from a
right-of-way granted to the state "for a specific, non-Indian related purpose"); Burlington N. R.R. Co.
v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that a congressional grant of a railroad rightof-way across reservation trust lands defeases tribal jurisdiction to the extent the grant's purposes
require).
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Indians" to justify applying Montana,8 0 the Court concluded that neither of
the two Montana exceptions sanctioned the tribal court's jurisdiction.
With respect to Montana's "consensual relationships" exception, the Court
acknowledged that the defendant had a contractual agreement with the
Tribe for on-reservation subcontract work.' 81 The Court opined, however,
that for purposes of applying the first Montana exception, the relevant
nonmember conduct in this case was the tortious conduct alleged by 82the
plaintiff rather than conduct connected with the contractual agreement.'
The Strate Court also held that the plaintiff failed to qualify for tribal
court jurisdiction under Montana's second exception. The Court conceded
that careless driving on a public highway through an Indian reservation
appears to satisfy Montana's requirement of a showing of nonmember
conduct that "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."' 183 The Court
expressed concern, however, that "if Montana's second exception requires
no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule. ' 184 Based on this
concern, the availability of state civil litigation as a means of deterring and
compensating for dangerous driving, and Montana's citation to precedents
that "raised the question whether a State's (or Territory's) exercise of
authority would trench unduly on tribal self-government," the Strate Court
confined application of Montana's second exception to accord with what
the Court referred to as the exception's "preface," i.e., Montana's
intimation that Indian tribes' inherent sovereign authority does not extend
"'beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations."" 8 5 Without further analysis the Court summarily
concluded that "[n]either regulatory nor adjudicative authority over the
of
state highway accident at issue is needed to preserve 'the right
86
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.""
Strate thus appears to have effected a diminishment of both Montana
exceptions while extending Montana's "general rule"-i.e., Montana's
presumption against inherent tribal governing authority over
nonmembers-to include (1) tribal adjudicative jurisdiction as well as
legislative jurisdiction and (2) conduct on state highways as well as nonIndian fee lands. 187 Strate's determination that, for purposes of a Montana
'go
Strate, 520 U.S. at 456.
' Id. at 457.
For a critical discussion of the Court's application of this exception, see
182 See id. at 457.
Todd Miller, Easements on TribalSovereignty, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 105, 118-19 (2001).
"83Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981), quoted in Strate, 520 U.S. at 457-58.
"84Strate,

520 U.S. at 458.

's'
Id.at 458-59 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
116Id. at 459 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
187 For

an analysis of how an alternative "minimalist" approach might have generated a contrary

result in Strate, see Sarah Krakoff, UndoingIndian Law One Case at a Time: JudicialMinimalism and
TribalSovereignty, 50 Am.U. L. REV. 1177, 1216-22 (2001).
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analysis, the state highway at issue was sufficiently analogous to nonIndian fee lands suggested nonetheless that the status of the land would
remain a crucial threshold consideration. 8 8 The Court's 2001 decision in
Nevada v. Hicks,18 9 however, has cast doubt on whether the Court will
continue regarding as presumptively valid tribes' exercise of civil
adjudicative and legislative authority over the conduct of nonmembers on
land owned by tribes and tribal members within reservation boundaries.
3.

Nevada v. Hicks

In Hicks the Supreme Court considered whether the Fallon PaiuteShoshone Tribes could adjudicate a civil action brought by a tribal
member, Floyd Hicks, alleging that Nevada game wardens, acting in their
individual capacities, had committed various civil offenses under tribal
law, and had violated his federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the
course of searching Hicks's on-reservation property for evidence of an
alleged off-reservation crime. The Court held that the tribal court lacked
authority to hear Hicks's case. The Court concluded that tribal jurisdiction
over Hicks's tribal law claims against the state officials was lacking
pursuant to an application of the Court's Montana test, and that no federal
90
authorization existed for the tribal court to hear Hicks's § 1983 claim.'
While Hicks fits within the recent trend of decisions disfavoring tribes'
power to govern the conduct of nonmembers, 19 1 the peculiar analysis
employed by the Court distinguishes the case as exceptional. Most
surprising, perhaps, was the Court's unprecedented application of the
Montana test to an assertion of tribal authority over the conduct of
nonmembers occurring within reservation boundaries on land belonging to
a tribal member. Prior to Hicks, the Court consistently confined its use of
the Montana test to assertions of tribal authority over nonmembers'
conduct on non-Indian fee land, or on land deemed to be the equivalent
thereof.192 In Hicks, however, the Court declared tribal ownership of land
188See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 427 (1989) (opinion of White, J.) (distinguishing previous Supreme Court case that acknowledged
tribes' inherent sovereign power to tax nonmembers as a case that "did not involve the regulation of
[non-Indian] fee lands, as did Montana"); cf New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
330-31 (1983) (stating question of whether a state may restrict a tribe's regulation of hunting and
fishing by nonmembers on the reservation is not resolved by Montana because "Montana concerned
lands located within the reservation but not owned by the Tribe or its members").
'89533 U.S. 353 (2001).
'90 Id. at 357-69, 374-75. The Court also held that the state game wardens were not required to
exhaust their jurisdictional claims in tribal court before bringing those claims in federal court. See id
at 369; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 7.04[3] (discussing tribal court exhaustion
doctrine).
l91See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
92 E.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (non-Indian fee land); Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (federally granted right-of-way deemed to be the equivalent of nonIndian fee land); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 692 (1993) (area taken for federal dam
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to be merely "one factor to consider" in judicially determining whether an
exercise of tribal governing authority over nonmembers "is 'necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.""'1 93 The
Court did not address the tension between this extension of Montana and
previous Supreme Court cases tacitly confining Montana's application to
tribal exercises of authority over the conduct of nonmembers on the
equivalent of non-Indian fee lands. Instead, the Court posited two
assertions as support for this extension of Montana. First, the Court noted
that in divesting tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe'9 4-the case from which, according to Hicks,
Montana had derived its "'general proposition' denying tribal authority
over nonmembers' 95-"drew no distinctions based on the status of the
land." 96 And second, the Court stated that Montana's declaration that
tribes "'retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians, even on non-Indian fee lands"' exhibited a
clear implication "that' 97the general rule of Montana applies to both Indian
and non-Indian land."'
The Hicks Court's assessment of the quoted dictum from Montana as
"clearly implying"'' 9 8 that Montana's presumption against tribal authority
project and characterized as "broadly opened up ... to non-Indians"); see also El Paso Natural Gas Co.
v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 482 n.4 (1999) (rejecting petitioner's invitation to apply Strate analysis to
question of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers because "[b]y contrast, the events in question
here occurred on tribal lands"); cf Hicks, 533 U.S. at 388 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (noting that in cases prior to Hicks "we indicated that the fee simple status
of the land triggered application of Montana").
'9' Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
'" 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
'9' Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). Montana states that "the
principles on which [Oliphant] relied support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." Montana,
450 U.S. at 565, quoted in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358-59; see also supra notes 21-26 and accompanying
text. But see Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (reasoning that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians because the exercise of such authority conflicts with "the overriding sovereignty of the
United States"); supra text accompanying notes 14-15, 58. As noted in Montana, the "principles" to
which the Court therein referred are articulated not in Oliphant but as dicta in United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), quoted in Montana, 450 U.S. at 563-64. Wheeler's positing of a correlation
between the "implicit divestiture of [tribal] sovereignty" and "relations between an Indian tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe," Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326, quoted in Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, is susceptible
to differing interpretations in light of conflicting pronouncements by the Supreme Court and individual
Justices in later opinions. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Court's
subsequent decision in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), confirming that Indian tribes retain
inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a generic class of nonmembers (i.e.,
nonmember Indians) weakens Hicks's reliance on Montana's countervailing "general proposition"
derived from "the principles on which [Oliphant] relied," Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. This doubtful
reliance is partially explained by the fact that the Court deliberated and decided Hicks three years
before clarifying the scope of tribes' inherent sovereign authority over nonmember Indians in Lara.
See COHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.03.
'96Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359.
197Id. at 359-60 (quoting Montana,450 U.S. at 565).
'98Id. at 360.
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over nonmembers applies to conduct on tribal land seems doubtful.
Montana itself expressly confined its articulation and application of that
presumption to the "narrow" issue of tribal regulatory authority over "nonIndian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by
nonmembers of the Tribe,"'199 and the Supreme Court's tribal jurisdiction
cases prior to Hicks maintained a similar view of the limited proprietary
reach of the Montana presumption.
In light of Montana and its preHicks progeny, the dictum quoted in Hicks more logically should be read
as implying that Montana's presumption does not apply to the exercise of
tribal authority over nonmember conduct on land owned by tribes or tribal
members. In the Montana Court's view, tribes thus are presumed to retain
inherent sovereign power to regulate the conduct of nonmembers on land
owned by tribes and tribal members; whereas the opposite presumption
obtains with respect to tribes' regulatory authority over nonmembers on
non-Indian fee lands, requiring tribes to justify such regulation under
Montana'stwo exceptions.2 °'
The Hicks Court's reliance on Oliphant for broadening Montana's
application beyond its previous limits is also puzzling. In Oliphant the
Court declared tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to be lacking
not because of a presumption against tribal authority over nonmembers
anywhere within reservation boundaries but because, in the Court's view,
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians conflicted with the
United States's "great solicitude that its citizen be protected ... from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty. 20 2 Later, the Court made
clear that Oliphant's denial of tribes' criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
did not compel any comparable foreclosure of tribes' authority over
nonmembers in the civil jurisdiction arena. 3 In Hicks the Court provided
no substantive justification for suggesting a general departure from these
199Montana, 450 U.S. at 557; see also N. Bruce Duthu & Dean B. Suagee, Supreme Court Strikes
Two More Blows Against Tribal Self-Determination, 16 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 118, 119 (2001) (noting
that as to trust lands Montana's presumption against tribal authority over nonmembers is dictum
"because tribal authority over trust lands was not at issue").
200 See supra notes 188, 192 and accompanying text.
See generally Allison M. Dussias,
Geographically-Basedand Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme
Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1994).
201 Cf Montana, 450 U.S. at 557 (stating that appellate court's conclusion that tribe may prohibit
nonmember hunting and fishing on tribal or trust land is a holding with which the Supreme Court "can
readily agree"). In context, Montana's statement that tribes "retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations," id. at 565 (emphasis
added), thus appears to reiterate Congress's ability to divest tribes of such jurisdiction rather than to
imply a broader proprietary scope for Montana's presumption against retained tribal authority over
nonmembers in the absence of congressionally imposed limitations. See id. at 557-63 (discussing
effect of allotment legislation in diminishing tribal jurisdiction).
202 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978); see supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
203 Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56 (1985);
see also supra notes 156, 158 and accompanying text.
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settled constraints
on Oliphant's applicability in the tribal civil jurisdiction
2 4
context.

0

Based on its conclusion that Montana's presumption against tribal
authority applies regardless of the status of the land on which nonmember
activity occurs, the Hicks Court proceeded to determine whether,
hypothetically, the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes would have been able to
regulate the state officers in the course of their conducting an onreservation investigation for an alleged off-reservation crime. 0 5 The Court
reasoned that this speculative approach was proper in view of the
"holding" in Strate v. A-i Contractors that a tribe's adjudicative
jurisdiction over nonmembers "'does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction,"' since a finding that the Tribes lacked regulatory authority
would permit the Court to avoid addressing the open question of "whether
a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmember defendants equals its
legislative jurisdiction. 2 °6 The ironic effect of this avowed reluctance to
address broader issues was to lead the Court to adjudicate a question of
tribal regulatory authority that was not at issue in the case and that
consequently was not fully briefed or argued by the parties.20 7 To the
extent Hicks's unusual methodology is followed in future cases, it may lead
other courts to engage in similarly overbroad decisionmaking, adjudicating
a hypothetical exercise of tribal legislative jurisdiction whenever a tribal
court's subject matter jurisdiction is in dispute. 208 The Supreme Court's
Getches, supra note 87, at 333-34.
v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 (2001).
20
6Id.at 357-58 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,453 (1997)).
207 In briefing the Supreme Court, respondents urged affirmance of the Ninth Circuit's
204See

205Nevada

determination that tribal adjudicative jurisdiction followed perforce from the tribes' derivative authority
to regulate nonmember conduct on lands with respect to which the tribes retained power to prohibit
nonmembers' entry. See Brief of Respondents the Tribal Court in and for the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone
Tribes t al., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (No. 99-1994), 2001 WL 57510, at *6; see also
Nevada v. Hicks, 196 F.3d 1020, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit's analysis, however,
proceeded from its view that the Montana test did not govern tribal authority over nonmember conduct
on such lands. See id. at 1025-29. Although the Hicks Court stated that the argument put forward in
the state petitioners' brief "is that the Tribes lacked adjudicatory authority because they lacked
regulatory authority over the game wardens," Hicks, 533 U.S. at 370 n.9 (citing Brief for Petitioners,
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (No. 99-1994), 2000 WL 1784132, at "36-*44), no such
argument appears in the petitioners' brief. See generally Brief for Petitioners, Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (No.
99-1994), 2000 WL 1784132. The parties' briefs contain no discussion anticipating the Supreme
Court's inquiry into tribal regulatory jurisdiction as a prerequisite under the Montana test for
determining whether tribal court jurisdiction existed in Hicks. See also Bryan H. Wildenthal, Fighting
the Lone Wolf Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflections on the ParadoxicalState of American
Indian Law, 38 TULSA L. REv. 113, 138-40 (2002) (discussing link in Hicks between regulatory and
1",j
adjudicative jurisdiction).
208 The Court's reliance on Strate v. A-] Contractorsfor hypothetically addressing the issue of
tribal regulatory authority in Hicks is questionable. Although the Strate Court referred to its assertion
that "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction" as a "hold[ing],"
Strafe, 520 U.S. at 453, the assertion appears to function as mere dictum in Strate, put forward to
contextualize a countervailing statement in Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), and
not essential to the Court's ultimate denial of tribal court jurisdiction over the highway accident at issue
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concerns about avoiding broader issues thus suggest that Hicks's
anomalous analytic approach be applied sparingly in future cases.2 °9
Applying its Montana analysis to a hypothetical attempt by the Fallon
Paiute-Shoshone Tribes to regulate state officials engaged in searching a
tribal member's on-reservation property for evidence of an alleged offreservation crime, the Hicks Court dismissed in a footnote the applicability
of Montana's first exception, declaring that the exception applies only to
"privateconsensual relationship[s], from which the official actions at issue
in this case are far removed." 210 In her separate opinion in Hicks, Justice
O'Connor noted the lack of support for this sweeping assertion and
emphasized the disparity between it and the many consensual and
cooperative agreements between tribal governments and state governments
' 2 11
which "could provide official consent to tribal regulatory jurisdiction.
Justice O'Connor's concern about the Hicks footnote being construed to
"create a per se rule that forecloses future debate as to whether cooperative
agreements, or other forms of official consent, could ever be a basis for
impetus for courts to read Hicks
tribal jurisdiction '212 provides additional
213
facts.
its
to
confined
narrowly
as
The Hicks Court further concluded that a hypothetical exercise of tribal
regulatory jurisdiction over the state officials would not be justified under
Montana's second exception. The Court framed the test as whether such
jurisdiction "is'necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations,' 21 4 thus invoking the Montana language that the Court
in Strate v. A-i Contractorsreferred to as the Montana test's "preface. 2 15
The Court did not provide a clear explanation for selecting this "preface"
in Strate. See Strafe, 520 U.S. at 448, 450-53 (addressing Iowa Mutual statement); see also supra
notes 157-160, 168-170 and accompanying text. Moreover, unlike in Hicks, the Court in Strate did not
address tribal regulatory jurisdiction as a necessary prerequisite to ascertaining the existence of tribal
adjudicative jurisdiction, indicating that Strate's methodology compels no such threshold
determination. See id.at 448, 456-60 (applying Montana test directly to "tribal-court action").
Criticism of the dictum Hicks relies on as Strate's "holding" adds further doubt to the accuracy of the
Court's characterization of that dictum as a "principle of Indian law," Hicks, 533 U.S. at 357-58. See,
e.g., WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 85 (4th ed. 2004) ("Even if the

two types of jurisdiction are held to be equal, the limitation of adjudicatory jurisdiction is an anomaly
and it is not clear where Strate discovered it.").
209 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n.2 (limiting Hicks's holding to "the question of tribal-court
jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law"); see also id at 376 (Souter, J.,concurring)
(reiterating limitation on Hicks's holding); id.at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (same); cf. CANBY,
supra note 208, at 296 ("Hicks... should not be read too categorically or without reference to the state
law enforcement interest that it involved.").
210Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359 n.3.
211
Id at 393 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
212
Id.
at 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
213
See also Robert N. Clinton, There is No FederalSupremacy Clausefor Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ.
ST. LJ.113, 229-30 (2002) (criticizing Hicks's treatment of Montana'sconsensual relationship test).
214Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
215Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997); see also supra text accompanying notes
128, 185.
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as comprising the test applicable in Hicks, to the apparent exclusion of the
specific language of Montana's second exception.2 16 Because of the
Court's inconsistency over time in relying on the "preface" versus the
language of the second exception,2 17 Hicks adds further
unpredictability
2 8
and instability to the Court's Montanajurisprudence. 1
Proceeding with its discussion of whether a hypothetical exercise of
tribal regulatory authority over the state game wardens in Hicks would
have been sufficiently connected to the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes'
right to govern themselves, the Court asserted that the right of tribal selfgovernment "does not exclude all state regulatory authority on the
reservation" and that "[s]tate sovereignty does not end at a reservation's
border., 2 19 However, in emphasizing a gradual departure from the rule of
complete exclusion of state law on Indian reservations as originally
announced in Worcester v. Georgia,22 ° the Hicks Court neglected to
observe that notwithstanding limited exceptions,22 1 "the basic policy of
Worcester has remained., 222 Hicks's skewed portrayal of the extent of
216

The Court's statement in Hicks that "[tiribal assertion of regulatory authority over

nonmembers must be connected to [the] right of the Indians to make their own laws and be governed by
them," Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361, may approximate Montana's presumptive denial of the "exercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations,"
Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. However, the Hicks statement does not appear to account for any additional
governing authority tribes retain under Montana's exceptions, which enlarge the scope of retained
inherent sovereign power beyond that which tribes would possess solely as a function of Montana's
"general rule." See Strate, 520 U.S. at 446 (noting that Montana "described a general rule" that is
"subject to two exceptions"). It is thus unclear whether the Court's analysis of tribal power in Hicks
adequately incorporates the substantive content of Montana's second exception. See also Hicks,
533 U.S. at 360 (listing cases cited in Montana as examples of tribal power cognizable under
Montana's "general rule" without including additional examples of tribal authority cognizable under
Montana's exceptions); cf Getches, supra note 87, at 334 (stating that in Hicks, Montana's "tribal
interests exception was not even analyzed").
217Compare Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360-61 (privileging Montana language focusing on right of tribal
self-government in applying Montana's second exception), and Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (same), with
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 657-58 n.12 (2001) (positing that Montana's second
exception "does not broadly permit the exercise of civil authority wherever it might be considered
'necessary' to self-government"); see also supra text accompanying notes 128, 185.
218See Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and Its Discontents: An Essay Introducing the Case for
Reargument before the American Indian Nations Supreme Court, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 63-65
(2003) (criticizing Court's inconsistent applications of the Montana analysis); Suagee, supra note 47, at
97-106 (same).
219Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361. For analyses and criticism of the sources relied on as support for
Hicks's expansive view of state sovereignty in Indian country, see Clinton, supra note 213, at 231-33;
Melissa L. Tatum, A JurisdictionalQuandary: Challenges Facing Tribal Governments in Implementing
the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts, 90 KY. L.J. 123, 158-59
(2002).
20 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), cited in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 36 1.
221See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, §§ 6.01[3], 6.03[l][b], at 522-24.
222 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959); see also CANBY, supranote 208, at 93 (noting that
historically the proposition that state sovereignty extends onto Indian reservations was true as to the
conduct of non-Indians but that "it ordinarily had not been applied in a situation where state
enforcement mechanisms were applied to an Indian in Indian country"); COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, § 6.01[2], § 6.01[3], at 506, § 6.01[4].
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state power in Indian country can be attributed in part to the obvious error
made by the Court in suggesting that Worcester could be distinguished on
the grounds that an 1828 treaty had guaranteed that the Cherokee Indians
would never be subject to state law.22 3 The Worcester decision in fact did
not address the 1828 treaty cited in Hicks.224
The instant effect of this dictum avowing state power on Indian
reservations was to shift the Court's focus away from the question of tribal
authority presented in Hicks and toward a more gratuitous discussion of
state authority not actually at issue in the case. Thus the Court noted its
earlier validation of a state sales tax on nonmembers purchasing cigarettes
at on-reservation tribal tobacco outlets, as well as state power to impose
minimal burdens on tribes to aid in tax collection, based on a balancing of
"the interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand,
and those of the State, on the other., 225 The Court then intimated that such
balancing was proper for determining whether tribal regulation of the state
game wardens in Hicks was hypothetically valid as well. 2 6
This suggestion that the kind of interest-balancing sometimes applied
to questions of state power in Indian country,227 may also be used to delimit
tribal power is without precedent in the Supreme Court's Indian law
jurisprudence. As Justice O'Connor observed in her separate opinion in
Hicks, "[the Court's] prior decisions are informed by the understanding
that tribal, Federal, and State Governments share authority over tribal
lands."2 28 A leading Indian law scholar likewise notes:
Not only has the Supreme Court never applied the test of
whether state action infringes on the right of reservation
Indians to be governed by their own rules to tribaljurisdiction
cases but, when it has used the test the Court has clearly
rejected arguments that state jurisdiction should presumptively
223See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361-62 n.4.

Clinton, supra note 213, at 232-33 (1828 treaty pertained to a different tribal entity);
Suagee, supra note 47, at 122 (1828 treaty pertained to different lands). For a discussion of potentially
increasing reliance on treaty provisions precluding state authority in Indian country in the wake of
Hicks, see John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Treaty-BasedExclusionsfrom the Boundariesand Jurisdictionof the
States, 71 UMKC L. REv. 763 (2003). See also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense Out ofNevada
v. Hicks: A Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 347, 359 (2001) (theorizing that after Hicks "a
treaty conferring upon a tribe the right to exclude ... should at least amount to a federal law
preempting state jurisdiction to investigate crimes on the reservation without tribal approval").
225 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156
(1980), quoted in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362. Colville's validation of certain state regulatory burdens
reflects a limited exception to the general preclusion of state law as putatively applied to tribes or tribal
members
226 in Indian country. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 6.03[1][b], at 522.
See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362-65.
227
See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 2, § 6.03[2][a], at 529-31.
221Hicks, 533 U.S. at 353, 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
224 See

As to tribes and tribal members in Indian country, moreover, state jurisdiction is generally precluded.
See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, §§ 6.01[2], 6.01[4], 6.03[1][a].
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apply whenever no infringement can be proved.229
Indeed, the very tax case that Hicks invoked affirmed that the tribes in
question possessed inherent sovereign power to levy their own tax on
cigarette sales to nonmembers within reservation boundaries, thereby
demonstrating the concurrent, rather than exclusive, nature of the state
regulatory authority validated in that case. 230 The Hicks Court's failure to
reconcile with precedent its use of interest-balancing to deny tribal
adjudicative authority underscores the importance of reading Hicks as
strictly limited to cases involving assertions of tribal jurisdiction over state
officials conducting on-reservation investigations
for alleged off23
reservation violations of state criminal law. '
The Hicks Court ultimately concluded that because a balancing of
interests weighed in favor of a hypothetical finding that the state's onreservation investigative authority did not infringe tribal self-government,
the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes were precluded from regulating, and
hence adjudicating, the conduct of Nevada's game wardens. In identifying
the respective interests to be balanced, the Court inferred from the
existence of the state's off-reservation criminal jurisdiction a "corollary
right to enter a reservation (including Indian-fee lands) for enforcement
purposes., 232 Relying on dicta from the nineteenth-century cases of Utah
23 3 United States v. Kagama,
2 34 and Fort
& Northern Railway Co. v. Fisher,
235
Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe as "point[ing] in [the] direction" of
this "corollary right," the Court concluded that "in accordance with these
prior statements, ... tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing
process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential
to tribal self-government or internal relations.
,236
The Court's misplaced reliance on Fisher, Kagama, and Lowe to
conduct its novel and anomalous balancing test 237 produced an unusual
weighting of the respective interests. It is difficult to find support in these
cases for the Hicks Court's view that states have a strong interest in
229 Getches, supra note 87, at 335 (citation omitted); see also Andrea M. Seielstad, The
Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under FederalLaw: Legal, Historical,and
Normative Reflections on a FundamentalAspect of American Indian Sovereignly, 37 TULSA L. REV.
661, 709 n.226 (2002) ("[Hicks's] discussion of state sovereignty departs from the analysis consistently
applied by the Court in its precedent regarding tribal sovereignty, including its decision in Montana.").
230See Colville, 447 U.S. at 152-54.
231See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n.2.
232Id. at 362-63.
233 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
234 118 U.S. 375 (1886).

23' 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
236 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363.
237Balancing interests, even to determine state power in Indian country, is a late-developing and
often-criticized judicial innovation in the field of Indian law. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2,
§ 6.03 [2][a], at 529-31.
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subjecting a tribal member and his property to state criminal process within
reservation boundaries. In Fisher the Supreme Court permitted the
territorial government of Idaho to serve process on a railroad company
within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Hill Indian Reservation for tax
enforcement purposes, but only because (1) the company's right-of-way
had effectively been "withdrawn from the reservation" by an act of
Congress and (2) the Indians' rights would not thereby be impaired. 238 The
Fisher Court relied on Langford v. Monteith,239 a case which likewise
recognized a narrow exception to the prevailing rule of complete exclusion
of state and territorial law within reservation boundaries, positing that
"[territorial] process may run there, however the Indians themselves may
be exempt from that jurisdiction." 24 0 Hicks's suggestion that Fisher
implies a "corollary right" of states to serve process on a tribal member on
Indian-owned land within reservation boundaries thus contradicts the
rationale and holding of both Fisher and Lang/ord,the only case cited in
Fisher as a controlling precedent.24'
Hicks's reliance on UnitedStates v. Kagama, a case validating
Congress's power to enact the Major Crimes Act of 1885,242 is similarly
doubtful. Kagama's observation that the Act "does not interfere with the
process of State courts within the reservation, nor with the operation of
238Fisher,116 U.S. at 31-32; see also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72, 73 &

n.2 (1962) (identifying Fisher'stwo grounds for permitting a territorial tax on a railway through Indian
country), cited in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361-62. The Indian rights involved in Fisherwere protected under
treaty provisions. See Fisher, 116 U.S. at 30-31. The case's reliance on Langfordv. Monteith imparts,
moreover, the Supreme Court's continuing recognition of the Indians' general exemption from the
reach of state and territorial authority within reservation boundaries, even apart from specific treaty
provisions. See Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145, 147 (1880), cited in Fisher, 116 U.S. at 30;
see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 6.01[3], at 507-10 (discussing, inter alia, Langford and
Fisher).
239See Fisher, 116 U.S. at 30 (citing Langford, 102 U.S. at 147).
24 0
Langford, 102 U.S. at 147, cited in Fisher, 116 U.S. at 30.
241 See Fisher, 116 U.S. at 30 (citing Langford, 102 U.S. at 147). The only other case cited in
Fisheris Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878), which the FisherCourt distinguished as having barred
a territorial court's service of process on a non-Indian resident of the Shoshone Reservation based on
the Court's "mistaken belief" that a treaty excluded reservation lands "from the limits and jurisdiction
of any State or Territory," Fisher, 116 U.S. at 30; see also Langford, 102 U.S. at 147 (explaining and
qualifying Harkness), cited in Fisher,116 U.S. at 30. The FisherCourt's distinguishing of Harkness
raises an additional question about the propriety of Hicks's reliance on Harkness for contextualizing
Fisher's observation that "[i]t has, therefore, been held that process of [a Territory's] courts may run
into an Indian reservation of this kind, where the subject-matter or controversy is otherwise within their
cognizance." Fisher, 116 U.S. at 31, quoted in alteredform in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363; see Hicks,
533 U.S. at 363 n.5 (citing Harkness, 98 U.S. at 478). Because Harkness held against service of
process, see Harkness, 98 U.S. at 478, the more likely source of the antecedent holding mentioned in
Fisheris Langford, where in "a suit between white men" the Court held in favor of territorial service of
process "however the Indians themselves may be exempt from that jurisdiction," provided that "the
subject-matter was one of which [the court] could take cognizance," Langford, 102 U.S. at 147;
see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 2, § 6.01 [3], at 507-08 (discussing Harknessand Langford).
242 See UnitedStates v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (discussing Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341,
23 Stat. 385). For further discussion of Kagama, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 5.01[4].
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State laws upon white people found there, 24 3 appears merely to reiterate
the Court's recognition, as reflected in Langford and Fisher,that state and
territorial law and process generally do not apply to Indians within
reservation boundaries. 2 " Indeed the Kagama Court reconfirmed the
exclusive authority of the federal government, vis-i-vis the states, to enact
Indian policy, 245 strongly implying that the states' off-reservation criminal
laws would be unenforceable against Indians in Indian country even in the
absence of federal legislation. 246 Kagama thus provides little support for
Hicks's view that states have a weighty, historically confirmed interest in
enforcing247their off-reservation criminal laws against Indians within Indian
country.

The other nineteenth-century opinion cited in Hicks as "point[ing] in
[the] direction ' 248 of a historic right of states to serve process within
reservation boundaries against Indians on Indian-owned land for crimes
allegedly committed off-reservation is Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v.
Lowe 249 which, according to Hicks, "explain[s] in the context of federal
enclaves" that "the reservation of state authority to serve process is
necessary to 'prevent [such areas] from becoming an asylum for fugitives
from justice.' ' 250 Lowe, however, is at least as clearly distinguished from
Hicks as Fisher or Kagama. In Lowe the Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of a state tax as applied to the property of a railroad
company within the boundaries of a federal military reservation. 25 1 The
Court concluded that a state statute consenting to the military reservation's
establishment but expressly "saving ... to the said State the right to serve
civil or criminal process" therein, did not impermissibly interfere with the
federal government's paramount use of the area as a military post.252 The
Court reasoned that the Constitution's grant of power to Congress to
exercise legislative authority "'over all places purchased by the consent of
the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of
forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards and other needful buildings'
entailed an exemption from state law within such federal enclaves only for
243Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383, quoted in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363.
244See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 2, §§ 6.01 [2],
6.01[4], 6.03[1][a].
245Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-85.
246See Getches, supranote 87, at 335 n.295.
247 The absence of historical support for the state's on-reservation law enforcement interest
discussed in Hicks casts additional doubt on the Court's intimating an analogy to a case recognizing
qualified immunity to avoid "unduly inhibit[ing] [federal] officials in the discharge of their [official]
duties." Anderson v. Creighton; 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987), quoted in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 365.
248 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 363.
114 U.S. 525 (1885).
250 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364 (quoting Lowe, 114 U.S. at 533) (second alteration added by the Hicks
249

Court).
251Lowe, 114 U.S. at 542.
212 ld. at 528.
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"all instrumentalities created by the general government" pursuant to
Congress's constitutionally delegated powers.2 3 The Court expressly
characterized the controversy over the applicability of the state tax on the
military reservation as "not being a case where exclusive [federal]
legislative authority is vested by the Constitution of the United States, 254
thereby implicitly distinguishing claims of state power on Indian
reservations, wherein the general, exclusive authority of the federal
government had been held to be constitutionally vested. 255 Hicks's reliance
on dictum from an obscure nineteenth-century military reservation case
seems doubly peculiar because it further reflects the Court's inexplicable
failure to acknowledge the complex web of tribal, federal, and state law
enforcement in Indian country 256 (including numerous tribal-state
extradition agreements and other cooperative arrangements), 2 " a
comprehensive regime that renders improbable the prospect of
258 Indian
reservations devolving into "asylum[s] for fugitives from justice.,
Just as surprising as Hicks's aggrandizement of states' interests was the
Court's complete disregard of tribal interests in conducting its judicial
balancing test.259 Thus, after inferring from dicta in Fisher, Kagama, and
528, 539 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17).
539.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, § 6.01[2], at 501-02. In dicta, the Lowe Court also intimated its apparent approval of the
Kansas attorney general's position that Indian reservations exempted by treaty from state jurisdiction
did not become part of the territory of the state upon admission of Kansas into the Union but instead
remained under exclusive federal jurisdiction, see Lowe, 114 U.S. at 527, a position consistent with
Indian law precedent, e.g., Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145, 146 (1880); see also Harkness v. Hyde,
98 U.S. 476, 477 (1878). The Court made clear, however, that its decision upholding state taxation of
railroad property on a military reservation was based on the Constitution's grant of only limited
congressional power to establish military posts, see Lowe, 114 U.S. at 528, 542, not on Congress's
constitutional authority over Indian affairs and Indian country, an authority subsequently clarified as
being broad, see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886) (proclaiming broad and
paramount congressional power in Indian affairs coextensive with Congress's duty to protect Indian
tribes from incursions emanating from the states).
256See, e.g., Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-09 (2000) (clarifying and
strengthening federal support for law enforcement services in Indian country); see also COHEN'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, §§ 9.01-.09 (discussing criminal jurisdiction in Indian country). See
generally Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a
JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 503 (1976).
217 For examples of tribal-state cooperative law enforcement arrangements in Indian country
compiled in post-Hicks litigation documents, see Brief for Amicus Curiae National Congress of
American Indians et al. in Support of Respondents, Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the
Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003) (No. 02-281), 2003 WL 742053, at *11-*30;
Brief for the State of New Mexico et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents in Part, Inyo
County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003)
(No. 02-281), 2003 WL 742183, at.*3-*5. See also CANBY, supra note 208, at 183 (collecting cases
upholding tribal-state extradition arrangements). For further discussion of extradition in Indian
country, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 9.08.
258Lowe, 114 U.S. at 533, quoted in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.
259See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 392, 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
23 Id. at
2
14 Id. at
255 E.g.,

judgment) (stating that the Hicks majority gives only "a passing nod to land status at the outset of its
opinion"); CANBY, supra note 208, at 84 (observing the absence of weight given in Hicks to the fact
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Lowe a "considerable" interest of states in enforcing their off-reservation
criminal laws within reservation boundaries, 260 the Court concluded that
"even when [this interest] relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the
tribe's self-government than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state
self-government., 261 This apparent suggestion that tribes' sovereign interests
are subordinate to state law interests in a manner analogous to the states'
subordination to paramount federal law under the constitutional plan is at
odds with the entire corpus of Indian law decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court since the early 1800s. 2 6 2 As the Court explained in rejecting a similar
states' rights argument in Washington v. ConfederatedTribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, "it must be remembered that tribal sovereignty is
dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the
States., 263 Hicks's recurring allusion to the supremacy of federal law over
conflicting state law thus comprises an inapposite analogy for disregarding
the interests of Indian tribes in exercising governmental authority over
allegations that state officials violated tribal members' rights on Indianowned land within reservation boundaries. 2 "
that the tribal court plaintiff was a tribal member); Tatum, supra note 219, at 159 (observing that the
Hicks Court "never identified or examined a single governmental tribal interest" in conducting its
balancing test).
260The Court's assessment that "[t]he State's interest in execution of process is considerable,"
Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364, seems incongruous with the Court's assertion that the existence of states'
"corollary right" to enforce their off-reservation criminal laws in Indian country "is not entirely clear
from our precedent," id. at 363. See Seielstad, supranote 229, at 709-10 n.227.
261 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364. But see id. at 395-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring
in the judgment) ("The actions of state officials on tribal land in some instances may affect tribal
sovereign interests to a greater, not lesser, degree than the actions of private parties.").
262 E.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114
(1993) (holding that absent
express congressional authorization, state tax jurisdiction does not extend to tribal members residing in
Indian country); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (concluding that absent federal statute
sanctioning state's interference with tribal self-government, state-court jurisdiction over on-reservation
adoption proceedings is precluded); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)
(intimating that consideration of the backdrop of tribal sovereignty informs the determination that state
taxation of Indians' on-reservation income is preempted); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)
(prohibiting the exercise of state-court jurisdiction where it "would undermine the authority of the tribal
courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves"); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946) (upholding state jurisdiction to try
a non-Indian for a crime committed against another non-Indian on an Indian reservation because such
jurisdiction does not directly affect the Indians); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 (1898) (validating
state taxation of on-reservation cattle-grazing by non-Indian lessees of tribal land to the extent the tax
"is too remote or indirect to be deemed a tax upon the lands or privileges of the Indians"); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-63 (1832) (determining that preclusion of all state law and process
within reservation boundaries does not violate federal Constitution's safeguarding of inherent state
sovereignty); cf Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945) ("The policy of leaving Indians free from
state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history."). For a discussion of the limited
scope of state authority in Indian country, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supranote 2, §§ 6.01[l]-[4], 6.03.
263 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980) (upholding tribal sales tax); see also Montana v. Blackfeet
Tribe,
471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985) ("The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority
over relations with Indian tribes."); COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 2.01[2] (discussing federal
supremacy over the states with respect to Indian affairs).
264 See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364-65 (citing and paraphrasing Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S.

2006]

IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE RECONSIDERED

Hicks was not an auspicious case for judicially assessing tribal interests
in the course of deciding whether state criminal process as served on a
tribal member on Indian-owned reservation land without tribal consent was
precluded. No such legal question was raised by the Hicks dispute265 or
addressed by the lower courts.266 It is unclear, in any event, whether an
airing of tribal interests would have affected Hicks's formalistic
approach 267 to the hypothetical issue of the validity of compulsory state
criminal process as served on a tribal member on Indian land in Indian
country. As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her separate opinion, the
reasoning of the Hicks majority "treats as dispositive the fact that the
nonmembers in this case are state officials," thereby appearing to "nullif[y]
[tribal interests] through a per se rule., 268 But if the Court had engaged in
257, 263 (1880), in rejecting the argument that because the suit in Hicks was against state officers in
their individual rather than official capacities, the state's interest was minimal). In Davis the Supreme
Court affirmed Congress's power to authorize removal to federal court of a state-court criminal
proceeding against a federal official that implicated a question of federal law. Davis, 100 U.S. at 267-68.
The Davis Court's concern about state-court action against federal officials potentially "paralyz[ing] the
operations of the [federal] government" stemmed from the Court's recognition of the Constitution's
express guarantee of the supremacy of federal law. Id. at 263, 265-66. Because the Constitution
contains no comparable guarantee of the supremacy of state law vis-A-vis Indian tribes and indeed vests
exclusive authority over Indian affairs in the federal government, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, §§ 2.01[2]-[3], 5.01, 5.02[l], 6.01[2], Hicks's reasoning-by-analogy to Davis seems patently
misplaced. See also Wildenthal, supra note 207, at 142 (criticizing Hicks's implicit invocation of "a
mythical Supremacy Clause of [the Court's] own invention").
265 See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 356 (noting that the state game wardens twice had secured the
tribal court's permission prior to searching the tribal member's property).
266 See Nevada v. Hicks, 196 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1999); Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455
(D. Nev. 1996). At the Supreme Court level, the only allusion in the parties' briefs to the issue of a
possible preclusion of state law enforcement efforts directed against tribal members within reservation
boundaries appears in a paragraph near the end of the state petitioners' reply brief in connection with
the state's argument that in securing the tribal court's approval before searching Floyd Hicks's property
the game wardens were not thereby consenting to the tribal court's jurisdiction. See Reply Brief for
Petitioners, Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (No. 99-1994), 2001 WL 198524, at *18. The reply
brief cites no authority for its statement that "[w]hen evidence of crime exists on a reservation within
the boundaries of a State, the State is free to pursue the lead." Id. In oral argument, counsel for Floyd
Hicks reiterated the tribal respondents' surprise in reading the state's assertion of this position for the
first time in the reply brief, stating that if the petitioners' opening brief had taken that position "we
would have included sufficient authority for the proposition that the state authorities cannot go onto the
reservation to investigate crimes committed even off of the reservation by nonmembers, or allegedly by
nonmembers." Transcript of Oral Argument, Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (No. 99-1994),
2001 WL 300601, at *31 (statement of S. James Anaya on behalf of respondents); see also id. at *14
(statement of C. Wayne Howle on behalf of petitioners) (responding to request for citations to legal
authority supporting reply brief's assertion of state power to conduct on-reservation criminal
investigations for alleged off-reservation crime by explaining that "[i]t's only by reasoning and
inference that I get to the conclusion that we have this authority .... I confess... it's a great area of
uncertainty... "). For a discussion of the authority of state law enforcement officers in Indian country,
see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note,2; § 9.07.
267See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 371 ("That the actions of these state officers cannot threaten or
affect [tribal] interests is guaranteed by the limitations of federal constitutional and statutory law to
which the officers are fully subject."); see also Getches, supra note 87, at 333-35 (discussing Hicks's
formalistic analysis).
2'6Hicks, 533 U.S. at 392, 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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the more searching inquiry it conventionally applies when using a
balancing approach to resolve an issue of state infringement on tribal selfgovernment, 269 a number of weighty tribal interests might have been
identified, including "the Tribes' inherent sovereign interests in activities
on their land,, 270 in the integrity of existing and future tribal-state
extradition agreements and similar intergovernmental cooperative
arrangements, 2 7' in enjoying the expectation of exclusive governing
authority over tribal members on tribal property protected under treaty or
congressional statute,272 and in guarding against any potential "violation of
personal or property rights of a reservation Indian perpetrated by a state
officer trying to enforce state law on tribal land on the reservation., 273 In
addition, the Court might have discerned important federal interests
weighing on the tribal side of the balance,274 including the federal
government's interests in advancing its "deeply rooted" historic "policy of
leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control, 275 in precluding
the application of state law on Indian reservations except where Indians'
interests are not thereby affected,276 and in ensuring respect for the
authority of tribal courts as "permanent institutions charged with resolving
the rights and interests of both Indian and non-Indian individuals." 277 Full
269Because

of the longstanding rule that "[s]tate laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians

on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that state law shall apply,"
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
interest-balancing in Indian law ordinarily is confined to certain issues involving the potential
application of state authority to non-Indians or non-tribal members. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, § 6.03[1][b], at 524-25, § 6.03[2][a], at 529, 531.
210 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
271See CANBY, supra note 208, at 182-83.

272
See Singer, supra note 56, at 662-63.
273Getches, supra note 87, at 335 n.294; see also, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973) (rejecting argument that tribe's rights were not infringed by
subjecting individual tribal member to state law because her "rights as a reservation Indian were
violated when the state collected a tax from her which it had no jurisdiction to impose"); cf Nevada v.
Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455, 1466 (D. Nev. 1996) (positing that as an alternative to holding Montana
inapplicable "this court would presume that the Tribe has an interest in providing Mr. Hicks, and any
other tribal member similarly situated, a forum in which to vindicate [their] rights").
274See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156
(1980) (emphasis added) (balancing "the interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the
one hand, and those of the State, on the other"), quoted in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362.
275 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2,
§§ 6.01[2], 6.01[4], 6.03[l][a].
276See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496
(1946); Thomas v. Gay, 169U.S. 264 (1898); Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116U.S. 28 (1885);
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 6.0113].
277S. REP. NO. 103-88, at 8 (1993) (Senate report accompanying Indian Tribal Justice Systems Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-02, 3611-14, 3621, 3631 (2000)); see also, .g.g,Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) ("Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an
important part of tribal sovereignty."); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) ("Tribal
courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes
affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians."); supra Part IV.B.1
(discussing antecedent Supreme Court cases supporting broad on-reservation authority of tribal courts).
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consideration of the hypothetically-posed infringement issue thus would
have rendered doubtful the Court's conclusion that "a proper balancing of
... interests would give the Tribes no jurisdiction
over state officers
278
pursuing off-reservation violations of state law.
In contrast to its convoluted analysis denying the Fallon PaiuteShoshone Tribes' adjudicative authority over tribal law claims against the
state game wardens, the Supreme Court's disposal of the issue of whether
the Tribes had inherent sovereign power to decide Floyd Hicks's federal
civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was relatively straightforward.
Reiterating its view that a tribe's "inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over
nonmembers is at most only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction," the
Court reasoned that tribal courts, unlike state courts, "cannot be courts of
general jurisdiction., 279 The Court opined further that while some federal
statutes "proclaim" tribal-court authority over federal causes of action, "no
provision in federal law provides for tribal-court jurisdiction over § 1983
actions.,,280 The Court added that "serious anomalies" would exist if tribal
courts were permitted to adjudicate § 1983 claims since "defendants would
inexplicably lack the right available to state-court § 1983 defendants to
seek a federal forum" by invoking the general federal-question removal
statute which "refers only to removal from state court." 281 The Court
declined the invitation to redress this anomaly by granting tribal court
defendants the right to secure federal court injunctive relief against federal
claims initiated in tribal court, a judicial remedy that "effectively [would]
forc[e] [those claims] to be refiled in federal court., 282 The Court posited
instead that "the simpler way to avoid the removal283
problem is to conclude
... that tribal courts cannot entertain § 1983 suits.,
Despite some broad accompanying dicta,284 Hicks's foreclosure of
federal claims in tribal court is properly viewed as limited to § 1983 suits
brought against state officers for allegedly having committed civil rights
violations in the course of conducting officially authorized on-reservation
police investigations stemming from allegations of off-reservation crime.
This narrow reading seems consistent with the Court's clarification that its
§ 1983 holding merely rejects the contention that federal law enlarges
278Hicks, 533 U.S. at 374.
279Id. at 367.
20 Id. at 367-68.

281 Id. at 368.

The Court did not address whether anomalies associated with non-removable

federal claims in tribal court might reflect "the Federal Government's longstanding policy of

encouraging tribal self-government,", including via the "federal policy of deference to tribal courts."
Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14, 17; cf United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (noting that the

federal-tribal relationship "has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character").
2
'8Hicks, 533 U.S. at 368.
...
Id. at 369.
284For an analysis suggesting that Hicks's discussion of the § 1983 issue is exclusively dicta, see
id. at 402 n. I (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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tribal court jurisdiction beyond the limits imposed by the Court's first
holding,2 85 a holding that, in turn, is expressly limited to "the question of
tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law." 286 Hicks's
§ 1983 holding thus leaves open the possibility of tribal court jurisdiction
over § 1983 claims against state officials in factual settings other than onreservation investigations for alleged off-reservation crime, depending on
the particular outcome of the Montana analysis.28 7 Moreover, in light of
previous Supreme Court acknowledgments of Indian tribes' authority to
federal stte
statute
causes of action, 288ren
even where no feea
adjudicate federal
"proclaim[s]" it,28 9 Hicks's dictum disfavoring the label "courts of 'general
jurisdiction' as applied to tribal courts 290 should not be viewed as
supporting a denial of that authority except in cases raising § 1983 claims
officials under factual circumstances closely resembling those
against state
291
of Hicks.
The Court's excessive use of dicta for making sweeping statements
that contradict prevailing principles of Indian law and that stray
considerably beyond the narrow question of tribal court jurisdiction
presented in Hicks sharply limits the case's efficacy as authoritative
precedent.292 The Hicks Court itself repeatedly emphasized the limited
285See

concurring). For a discussion of Hicks's
id.at 366 n.7; see also id.
at 403 n.3 (Stevens, J.,

first holding, see supra notes 189-278 and accompanying text.
216Id. at 358 n.2.
287See id.at 403 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
288E.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 485-86 n.7 (1999) ("Under normal
circumstances, tribal courts, like state courts, can and do decide questions of federal law ...").
289Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367; see, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978)
(reasoning that notwithstanding silence of Indian Civil Rights Act as to tribal court jurisdiction, federalcourt remedy other than habeas corpus is unavailable because, inter alia, "[tjribal forums are available
");cf Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16-17
to vindicate rights created by the ICRA ....
(1987) ("In diversity cases, as well as federal-question cases, unconditional access to the federal forum
would place it in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's authority over
reservation affairs."). Hicks's contrary dictum, implying that tribal courts can adjudicate federal causes
of action only where federal statutes "proclaim" it, seems undermined, rather than supported, by that
dictum's reliance on tribes' "authority to adjudicate child custody disputes under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978." Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)). In part ICWA merely
codified Fisher v. District Court, a case which affirmed, as a manifestation of inherent tribal
sovereignty, tribes' exclusive jurisdiction over on-reservation child custody disputes involving tribal
members. Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386-89 (1976); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra
note 2, § 11.01, at 820; supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. The Hicks Court's apparent
suggestion that tribes can adjudicate child custody disputes only because ICWA "proclaim[s]" this
authority thus would require construing ICWA as having extinguished the inherent sovereign power of
tribes recognized in Fisher and having simultaneously replaced it with statutorily "proclaim[ed]"
authority instead. Such a construction of ICWA as impliedly divesting tribes of their preexisting and
federally recognized inherent sovereign authority would reflect a radical departure from principles of
statutory interpretation in Indian law. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 2.02 (discussing
Indian law canons of construction).
'9oHicks, 533 U.S. at 367.

291
See also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.01[2][d], at 217-18.
292 See State v. Cummings, 679 N.W.2d 484, 488-89 & nn.3-4 (S.D. 2004) (distinguishing
statements in Hicks that avow state's authority to enter an Indian reservation for law enforcement
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scope of its ruling, explaining that the case goes no farther than to deny
tribal court jurisdiction over "a narrow category of outsiders," i.e., state
officials,293 sued under tribal law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly
wrongful behavior in the course of conducting, "in the performance of their
law enforcement duties, ' '294 on-reservation investigations pursuant to
allegations of off-reservation crime.295 Recognizing the ultimate narrowness
296
of Hicks, the South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Cummings
declined to read Hicks as authorizing a state police officer's pursuit of a
tribal member onto an Indian reservation for an alleged off-reservation
traffic offense. In declining to overrule a 1990 decision in which the court
held that South Dakota's fresh pursuit statute "could not reach onto the
reservation," 297 the court wrote:
[T]he question in Hicks was whether the tribal court had
jurisdiction over state officers acting in their individual or
official capacity on tribal land. Hicks should be construed to
address that question only, and in fact, several federal courts
have done so. The question whether a state officer in fresh
pursuit for a crime committed off the reservation has
jurisdiction to enter the reservation without tribal permission
or a warrant was not squarely before the Court. We decline
to usurp the power of the United States Congress to make
laws with respect to Native American rights and sovereignty
and the authority of the Supreme Court to interpret those laws
by relying on dicta from a factually and legally
distinguishable case.2 98
While Hicks continues to provoke scholarly criticism, 299 its main
purposes as dicta insufficient to overrule precedent); cf ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 695-96 (4th ed. 2003) (questioning
authoritativeness of statements in Hicks pertaining to state power on Indian reservations because "seven
members of the unanimous Court in separate concurring opinions purported to resolve the case without
addressing the question of state jurisdiction unilaterally raised by Justice Scalia").
293Hicks, 533 U.S. at 371.
294 Id. at 373; see also id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted) ("The Court's
decision explicitly 'leave[s] open the question of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants
in general,' including state officials engaged on tribal land in a venture or frolic of their own.").
295See, e.g., id. at 358 n.2.

'96679 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 2004).
297State v. Spotted Horse, 462 N.W.2d 463, 467 (S.D. 1990), quoted in Cummings, 679
N.W.2d
at 486-87.
298 Cummings, 679 N.W.2d at 489 (citations omitted) (citing MacArthur v. San Juan County,
309 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2002); McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002); Fidelity & Guar.
Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 212 F. Supp. 2d 163 (W.D.N.C. 2002); United States v. Archambault, 174 F. Supp.
2d 1009 (D.S.D. 2001)).
299Several commentators have suggested that Hicks reflects a misplaced or erroneous application
of the Court's "new federalism" principles. See Getches, supra note 87, at 331 ("[Hicks] epitomizes
the use of states' rights as the lodestar for deciding an Indian case while disregarding or dismissing
traditional Indian law principles."); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial
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legacy likely will be an escalation of judicial concern about the ultimate
wisdom of the Supreme Court's experiment in unilaterally denigrating the
inherent sovereign powers of Indian nations in the absence of express
commands from Congress. That Hicks may have triggered a corrective
shift in judicial thinking on the topic of inherent tribal sovereignty is
probably best indicated by the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in
UnitedStates v. Lara,300 a case in which the Court itself appears to have
begun questioning the theoretical underpinnings of the series of cases,
beginning with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe3°' and ending with
Nevada v. Hicks,302 imposing ad hoc judicial limitations on tribal
authority. °3

Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 Am. U. L. REv. 1177, 1235 (2001) ("The facts of Hicks were
particularly troublesome, given the strong federalism concerns of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and
Thomas."); Singer, supra note 56, at 660 (discussing Hicks as demonstrating that "[t]he Supreme Court
has failed to provide tribes protection for their sovereignty that would have been provided to them had
they been states"); see also Catherine T. Struve, How Bad Law Made a Hard Case Easy: Nevada v.
Hicks and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 288, 315 (2003)
(theorizing that the facts of Hicks predictably raised federalism concerns but that "[t]hese concerns ...
could be addressed by providing for removal and/or federal appellate review" should a tribal court
"overenforce federal rights against [a] state official"); cf John P. LaVelle, The Rise of the "New
Federalism" from the Destruction of Indian Rights: A Meditation 1 (course materials for the 26th
Annual Indian Law Conference, Albuquerque, N.M., Apr. 5-6, 2001) (on file with the ConnecticutLaw
Review) (criticizing Supreme Court's use of Indian law cases to implement changes in federalism
doctrine). See generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law
andthe Rehnquist Court: The Needfor Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003).
Others have criticized Justice Souter's separate opinion in Hicks, see Hicks, 533 U.S. at 375-86
(Souter, J., concurring), especially for its positing of questionable policy-based rationales for applying
the Montana test beyond Hicks's narrower confines, see Stacy L. Leeds, The More Things Stay the
Same: Waiting on Indian Law's Brown v. Board of Education, 38 TULSA L. REv. 73, 82-84 (2002)
("Justice Souter's concurring opinion employs veiled rationales of tribal inferiority."); see also Tatum,
supranote 219, at 160-61; Wildenthal, supra note 207, at 143.
'00541 U.S. 193 (2004).
30' 435 U.S. 191 (1978); see also supra Part III.A. and accompanying notes.
302 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
303For further discussion of Lara, see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 2, § 4.03.

